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Abstract 
This paper analyzes the bank restructuring process in Malaysia from the 
currency crisis of 1997 to present. Even though the banking sector in 
Malaysia had relatively lower NPLs compared to other Asian countries, 
financial sector suffered financial crisis and various problems emerged.     
        This paper covers topics such as setting up financial restructuring 
agencies, a scheme of capital injection to weak banks, and a corporate 
restructuring process conducted by the Malaysian government.  Plans of 
Mergers/ closures of banks, setting up an asset management company, a 
recapitalization agency, and a corporate debt restructuring committee, such 
as Pengurusan Danaharta Nasional Berhad (Danaharta), Danamodal 
Nasional Berhad (Danamodal), and the Corporate Debt Restructuring 
Committee (CDRC), were accompanied by several policy measures such as 
an exchange rate system pegged to the U.S. dollar, capital controls, and a 
fiscal stimulus package.   
Through these measures, the authorities, to some extent, succeeded in 
bringing down NPLs and in merging several banks to some extent.  The 
reform was considered basically completed by 2002. The banking sector was 
reorganized with 10 banking groups, and two of the restructuring agencies 
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1. Introduction   
This paper analyzes the bank restructuring process in Malaysia from the currency crisis of 1997 
to the present. In the wake of the currency crisis, similar to its neighboring countries, Malaysia 
went through a currency crisis and banking problems. The economy suffered a severe recession 
that exposed a lack of supervisory schemes and the vulnerability of the banking system. After a 
brief period of fiscal tightening in 1997, the Malaysian Government implemented a number of 
medium- to long-term development plans, starting with fiscal measures to end the recession, 
followed by measures such as capital outflow control and re-adoption of the fixed exchange 
rate pegged to the U.S. dollar in 1998. 
 
This paper covers topics such as setting up financial restructuring agencies, a scheme of capital 
injection to weak banks, and the corporate restructuring process. Malaysia, just like other Asian 
countries, faced a massive task at the outset of the crisis in 1997. The crisis management 
strategy included continued structural reforms to promote competition and efficiency and to 
maintain financial stability in order to protect itself from future shocks and avoid another 
crisis.
1 After going through bank restructuring for a few years, banking sector reform was 
basically complete by 2002. The banking sector was reorganized with 10 banking groups. Two 
of the three fixed-term restructuring agencies were closed by 2003.   
As an emerging market economy, Malaysia showed clear success in its development strategy. 
During the past decades, prior to the crisis of 1997, the GDP growth rate averaged about 6% 
per year. The country's investment ratio was the highest in the region due to the development 
plans implemented from 1970 to the mid-1990s. By the early 1980s, the high growth rate was 
accompanied by increased budget deficits that accumulated to an unsustainable level of public 
debt. The authorities took measures to reduce the Government deficit.   
                                                   
1  Meesook et al. (2001) gives an overview of the Malaysian economy after the crisis and summarizes policy 
measures.   3
  
 
The strong economic performance continued during the 1990s prior to the crisis. Real output 
growth averaged 8.5% per year, the exchange rate remained stable, and international reserves 
were robust. Following nine consecutive years of robust economic growth, the banking 
institutions experienced strong performance in the first half of 1997. Non-performing loans had 
been on a downward trend. At the end of June 1997, the banking system had a NPL ratio of 
3.6%, while loan loss reserves (specific provisions, general provisions and suspended interest 
payments (interest-in-suspense)) amounted to 92% of total NPLs. Based on performance in the 
first half of the year, the banking system was expecting a period of relative stability for the rest 
of the year. There were, however, also signs of stress: the investment-led growth strategy was 
successful in raising output and income, while investment quality had deteriorated. This 
eventually led to major balance sheet weaknesses in the banking and corporate sectors, 
exposing the economy to the contagion effect from other Asian countries.     4
 
The environment changed drastically in the second half of 1997. In July 1997, the ringgit began 
to fall as a result of the first wave of contagion effects of the regional financial crisis triggered 
by Thai baht floatation on July 2, 1997. As currency traders took speculative positions in the 
offshore ringgit market in anticipation of a large devaluation, the offshore ringgit interest rates 
increased markedly, relative to the domestic rates. The fall in the value of the ringgit, 
accompanied by the sharp drop in the stock prices at the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange, 
strongly affected the earnings and overall performance of the corporate sector. As market 
confidence dramatically diminished along with the rest of the region, large portfolio outflows 
took place, as equity and property values declined substantially. Thus, the corporate sector 
experienced significant loss due to the sharp falls in the value of real estate and equities used as 
bank collateral. As a result, the banking sector was hit badly by the crisis. In the second half of 
1997, every banking institution had to cope with emerging difficulties such as a heightened 
upward pressure on domestic interest rates, intensified outflows of ringgit funds, tight liquidity 
conditions, loan provisioning requirements, and problematic borrowers. As a result, banks 
found themselves with increasing non-performing loans ratios. The intermediation function 
continued to function although several inefficiencies emerged. The total NPL ratio in the 
banking sector rose to 5.7% at the end of 1997. However, the NPL ratio in Malaysia was lower   5
than that in other crisis-affected Asian countries.   
In response to the deteriorating economy, the authorities raised interest rates and tightened 
fiscal policy in an attempt to restore market confidence in the financial system. In early 1998, 
fiscal policy was revised to a more expansionary stance. This policy mix was aimed at 
correcting external imbalances. However, the economic contraction was far worse than 
anticipated. The GDP growth rates slowed and turned sharply negative in 1998.
2 
 
In September 1998, several policy measures, such as an exchange rate system pegged to the 
U.S. dollar, capital controls, and a fiscal stimulus package, were launched by the Malaysian 
authorities.3  These measures were successful to some extent in protecting Malaysian industries 
from exchange rate fluctuations and in lowering of interest rates. The authorities also pursued 
fundamental reforms in the financial and corporate sectors, including a bank consolidation 
program and an upgrading of prudential regulation and supervision in line with international 
                                                   
2  GDP growth in East Asia’s crisis countries turned sharply negative in 1998. The steep decline in output was 
driven by a severe drop in private capital investment and, to lesser degree, by a reduction in private 
consumption. The largest drops in investment occurred in Indonesia and Malaysia. See Claessens, Djankov 
and Klingebiel (2001).  
3  See IMF (2000) for details.   6
best practices.   
In 1998, several measures were introduced in order to stabilize the banking sector and to lead 
further to reform that would continue for the medium and long term.
4 The  consolidation  of  the 
banking sector was initiated through mergers. The restructuring plan for strengthening the 
banking system was accompanied by the setting up of an asset management company, a 
recapitalization agency, and a corporate debt restructuring committee.   
In the second half of 1998, Pengurusan Danaharta Nasional Berhad (Danaharta), an asset 
management company, was set up as a pre-emptive measure to remove the NPLs from banking 
institutions. The objective of Danaharta was to maintain the level of NPLs in the banking 
system at a manageable proportion. Danamodal Nasional Berhad (Danamodal) was 
subsequently set up. Danamodal aimed to recapitalize banking institutions by capital injection. 
The setting up of the Corporate Debt Restructuring Committee (CDRC) was to provide a 
mechanism for the banking institutions and debtors to work out feasible debt restructuring 
schemes. Since the cases dealt with by the CDRC involved those with loans exceeding RM50 
million, special loan rehabilitation units were also established to manage smaller amounts of 
distressed loans. The debt restructuring progress was deemed to be complete and the CDRC 
was closed in August 2002. (For more details, see sections 6, 7 and 8.) 
In view of the importance of the intermediation role, the banking system is subject to 
Government supervision and intervention. The Malaysian Government was mindful of the 
importance of the banking system. The risk-weighted capital ratio of the banking system was 
11.3% as of the end of June 1998, well above the minimum BIS requirement. The economic 
slowdown, however, caused increases in the level of NPLs. This would erode the capital base 
of the banking institutions. The setting up of Pengurusan Danaharta Nasional Berhad 
(Danaharta) was aimed at dealing with the problems of rising NPLs in the banking system and 
to maintain the smooth and efficient functioning of the intermediation process. To address the 
issue of recapitalization, Danamodal was established as a pre-emptive measure to recapitalize 
and to enable domestic banking institutions to be more resilient, in terms of generating new 
lending activities. In this regard, the setting up of Danamodal and Danaharta would 
                                                   
4  The bank recapitalization strategies and financial distress resolutions of four East Asian countries 
(Indonesia, Republic of Korea, Malaysia and Thailand) are summarized in Claessens, Djankov and Klingebiel 
(2001).   7
complement each other towards strengthening the banking system and thereby accelerate the 
pace of economic recovery. The policy response of the Malaysian monetary authorities was 
prompt and appropriate.   
Consolidation through the merger process took place in 1999. The Government announced it 
was to form all domestic banking institutions into six banking groups in the second half of the 
year. However, only some institutions approved the plan because it was viewed by many to be 
politically-oriented and would not improve efficiency in the banking sector. The plan was 
finally frozen in September 1999. In one case, it was proposed that a small Malay bank would 
take over a larger non-Malay bank. After the protest, the plan to consolidate financial 
institutions into six banks was revised to 10 banks in October 1999. The consolidation of the 
domestic banking sector into 10 banking groups was completed by the end of 2001. Whether 
the merger has improved the efficiency and asset quality in the banking system still needs to be 
observed.  
The NPL ratio reached its peak at the end of 1998 and then declined. The net NPL ratio based 
on 3-month classification declined to 9.6% at the end of 2000, while the NPL ratio based on 
both actual and 6-month classification remained relatively stable throughout 2000. The 
resolution of NPLs did not show improvement during the course of 2001: the net NPL ratio of 
banking system based on both the 3-month and 6-month classification began to increase to 
11.5% and 8.1%, respectively.   
 
In addition to the merger programs and the NPL resolution programs established by the three 
agencies, Danaharta, Danamodal and CDRC, several measures were implemented to support 
small and medium sized enterprises back on the recovery track.     
On the surface, through these measures, the authorities, to some extent, succeeded in bringing 
down NPL ratios and in merging several banks. However, there were some skeptics. The 
decline of NPLs slowed down, especially during the course of 2001, due to the increase in 
NPLs in the manufacturing and property sectors. By the end of 2004, NPLs were again 
decreasing, but the level of NPLs was still as high as it was in 2000 at the 3-month 
classification and exceeded the level in 2000 at the 6-month classification. With regard to 
Danaharta, some observers feared that it would become a “warehouse” for NPLs, that is, it   8
would hold assets for a long time in the hope of asset price recovery in the future, rather than 
working out or auctioning off NPLs. It may take several years before we can conclude that the 
final resolution of the NPL problem is done and the scars from the 1997-98 crisis have been 
erased.  
The recovery in 1999–2000 was strong, accompanied by reduced vulnerability of the financial 
system.
5 
Although banking sector restructuring was not easy, significant progress had been 
made with NPL restructuring. In the latter half of 2000, however, downside risks of the 
economy emerged. The worldwide slowdown in the information technology sector, together 
with the depreciations of the yen and other regional currencies, adversely affected exports from 
Malaysia. Although financial restructuring has shown steady progress, it is important to 
continue restructuring the financial sector in order to improve the capacity of banks to manage 
risks and to deal with external shocks.   
                                                   
5  See Barro (2002), for example. In the Asian crisis countries, economic growth rebounded in 1999–2000, 
however, investment ratios did not significantly rebound, which might suggest that the crisis would have an 
adverse effect on long-term growth prospects. Park and Lee (2002) found a V-shaped recovery of real GDP 
growth following a crisis, but it was not unique to the East Asian countries. However, they show that East 
Asia experienced a far sharper contraction and recovery, which they attributed to more severe liquidity crises 
and weaker corporate and bank balance sheets.   9
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the resolution of 
non-performing loans in the banking sector. Section 3 describes the loan activities and capital 
adequacy. Section 4 summarizes the consolidation process of financial institutions through 
mergers and closures. Section 5 describes the creation of an asset management company, 
Danaharta, and its function. Section 6 presents a review of the fiscal support (public fund 
injection) for restructuring of the banking system. Section 7 summarizes the corporate Debt 
Restructuring Scheme in Malaysia. Section 8 concludes the paper.   
 
 
2. Resolution of Non-Performing Loans   
The financial turmoil following the devaluation of the Thai baht in July 1997 had a devastating 
effect on the Malaysian economy. The ringgit was floated in July 1997, and trended down 
following the Thai baht.
6 In the fall of 1997, the Malaysian policy against the currency crisis 
was similar to that in Thailand (IMF program of August 1997) and Indonesia (November 1997). 
The interest rate was raised, fiscal balance was tightened, and other austerity measures, such as 
suspension of public works, were taken. However, these measures deteriorated bank loan 
quality, as borrowers faced difficulties in their businesses and loan payments. The depreciation 
of the currencies in the region accelerated as crises in Korea and Indonesia deepened in 
December 1997. The quality of bank loans in Malaysia quickly deteriorated towards the end of 
1997.  
<NPLs in the banking system>   
Expressed as a percentage of total loans, NPLs in the banking system rose from 3.6% at the end 
of June 1997 to 5.7% at the end of 1997. The increase in the net NPL ratio was most significant 
in the case of finance companies. The net NPL ratio rose dramatically within six months in 
1997: from 4.3% in June to 7.8% in December. The net NPL ratio of the merchant banks was at 
4.5%, and of commercial banks at 5.0%, at the end of 1997. 
 
In calculating NPLs, asset classification is a crucial problem. Malaysia had, until the end of 
December 1997, defined NPLs as those loans up to six months overdue, and then revised the 
criterion to those loans up to three months overdue on January 1, 1998.   
The tightening of the classification of NPLs was aimed at recognizing problem loans held by 
banks and other financial institutions. It was expected to smooth the reduction in NPLs to 
promote banks’ lending activities and to fund projects that were still viable. The asset quality of 
                                                   
6  Malaysia officially adopted a floating exchange rate regime since 1975 (Bank Negara Malaysia, Annual 
Report 1997, p56), but the ringgit exchange rate level has been de facto fixed against US dollar.   10
the banking system, however, had worsened during 1998, reflecting the contraction of 
economic activities partly due to high interest rates. This was evident in the sharp increase in 
NPLs in the banking system in 1998. It was pointed out that the newly-introduced 3-month 
classification in that year increased the amount of NPLs in the banking system.   
Under these circumstances, Bank Negara Malaysia increased the time required for classifying a 
loan as non-performing from three months to six months in September 1998. The relaxing of 
the classification was intended to give borrowers more time to work out bad loans. However, 
this policy was against the ongoing strengthening of prudential regulations, and the new rule 
was inconsistent with the international practice of the 3-month classification as well.     
Table  2-1:  Classification  of  Non-Performing  Loans        
-Dec  97   Jan  98   Sep  98   
default  period     6-month  3-  month  6-month*  
* Loan classification is based on individual banking 
institution's NPL classification policy; i.e. 3-month or 
6-month classification (referred to "Actual").   
On a net basis, the actual NPL ratio of the banking system increased from 5.7% in December 
1997 to 9% in December 1998. The “actual” refers to the individual institution’s classification 
policy of either a 3-month or 6-month classification. Therefore, the “actual” NPL number 
and/or NPL ratio is taken from between the 3-month and 6-month numbers.   
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The net NPL ratio is defined by gross NPLs minus interest-in-suspense (IIS, or suspended 
interest payments) minus special provision (SP) divided by gross loans minus IIS minus SP. 
Based on the 3-month classification, the net NPL ratio of the banking system increased to 
13.2% as of end-December 1998. As of end-December 1998, 57 banking institutions reverted 
to the 6-month classification policy for NPL, and they then accounted for 54% of total loans of 
the banking system based on the three-month classification policy. The net NPL ratio of the 
banking system based on 6-month classification was 7.6%. 
The net NPL ratio was lowest for commercial banks in the banking system, remaining below 
10% based on both 3-month and 6-month classifications at end-December 1998. For finance 
companies and merchant banks, however, net NPL ratio exceeded 10%. The net NPL ratio 
based on 3-month classification of merchant banks was 25.6% at end-December 1998.   
Although NPLs increased during 1998, the rate of increase moderated during the fourth quarter 
of 1998. The average monthly increase in NPLs from October to December 1998 slowed down 
to 6.2% (including loans sold to Danaharta), as compared with the average monthly increase of 
11.3% in the first nine months of 1998. NPLs in the banking system had turned around and 
begun to decline in 1999; however, the level and the percentage of NPLs remained high. There 
was also the possibility that the relaxed classification of NPLs (six months) would mask the 
serious nature of the NPL situation.   
 
Other prudential rules, aside from reclassification of the period for NPLs in the second half of 
1998, were retained. For loans of RM1 million and below to be classified as “substandard,” the 
period in arrears was reduced from six months to three months; “doubtful,” from 12 months to 
six months; and “bad,” from 24 months to 12 months. The industry numbers for the NPLs 
based on both 3-month and 6-month classifications were published on a monthly basis. It was 
also required that all banking institutions with a gross NPL ratio above 10% sell their NPLs to 
Danaharta at market prices.   
 
Net NPLs in the banking system for 1999 reached its peak in January. NPLs in the banking 
system have declined since August 1999. The net NPL ratio in the banking system based on 
3-month classification was reduced from 13.2%, as of end-December 1998, to 11.0%, as of 
end-December 1999. The net NPL ratio of the banking system based on the 6-month   12
classification declined to 6.4% as of end-December 1999.   
Despite several measures undertaken for the rehabilitation of NPLs prior to 1999, gross actual 
NPLs In the banking sector rose by 3.5% during the course of 2000. There was an optimistic 
view with regard to the increase in NPLs, in that most of the increase came from accumulated 
overdue interest payments. Excluding interest-in-suspense, which rose by 21.5% to RM8 
billion during the year, the principal NPLs increased marginally by RM0.2 billion or 0.5% to 
RM39.8 billion, as of end-December 2000. Based on the 3-month classification, gross NPLs 
declined by 3.5% to RM62.5 billion as of end-December 2000. Gross NPLs based on the 
6-month classification, however, slightly rose to RM47.8 billion at the end of 2000. This 
showed that most NPLs became long-term NPLs rather than newly-created NPLs at this point.   
 
The fact is that the level of the net NPL ratio relatively remained the same at the end of 2000 
when compared to the level at the end of 1999. Although the banking system experienced a 
lower level of NPLs in 2000, compared to the peak level in 1998, the amount of NPLs 
remained relatively high. The net NPL ratio on a 6-month classification basis reduced slightly 
from 6.4% as of end-December 1999 to 6.3% as of end-December 2000.   
 
The asset quality of the banking sector worsened during the course of 2001, reflecting the 
increasing difficulties in the economic environment. The NPL ratio, on actual basis, increased 
by 2.2% from 7.1% at the end of 2000 to 9.3% at the end of 2001. The NPL ratios based on 
3-month classification and 6-month classification rose to 11.5% and 8.1%, respectively. The 
NPLs, on actual basis, rose by RM14 billion to RM66.6 billion and the NPLs on the 6-month 
classification amounted to RM60.7 billion at the end of 2001, both of which exceeded the level 
of the record-high NPL in 1998. With the prolonged economic stagnation of both the Malaysian 
economy as well as the world economy, the banking sector was expected to operate in a more 
competitive and severe environment. The NPL ratio in the banking system as a whole has 
decreased, and it was 7.8% for 3-month classification at the end of 2004. However, it still 
exceeded 3.3%: the level of 1996.   
 
<Individual financial institutions>   
In terms of the performance of different banking institutions, both commercial banks and 
finance companies were found to experience decline in their NPL ratios on a net basis, while 
the merchant banks could not reduce the NPL ratio in 1999. The net NPL ratio for commercial 
banks based on both 3-month and 6-month classifications declined in 1999. For the finance   13
companies, their net NPL ratio showed significant improvement. The actual NPL ratio, on the 
net basis, declined from 14.0% as of end-1998 to 9.7% as of end-1999. The net NPL ratio based 
on both 3-month and 6-month classifications declined from 21.8% as of end-1998 to 16.3% as 
of end-1999, and from 12.2% to 8.6%, respectively. The net NPL ratio for the merchant banks, 
however, remained high during 1999. The actual NPL ratio increased from 11.5% as of 
end-1998 to 12.7% as of end-1999 on a net basis. The net NPL ratio based on the 6-month 
classification also increased from 10.9% as of end-1998 to 12.3% as of end-December 1999. 
The net NPL ratio based on the 3-month classification still exceeded 20% and was 23.46% by 
end-December 1999.     
 
NPLs in the banking sector decreased from RM59 billion at the end of 1998 to RM51 billion at 
the end of 1999. The loan loss provisions (interest-in-suspense, specific provisions, and general 
provisions) of the banking system did not decline. They increased slightly from RM33.1 billion 
as of end-1998 to RM33.2 billion as of end-1999, due to increases in interest-in-suspense. 
Interest-in-suspense outstanding increased by RM619.4 million; in line with continued 
suspension of interest payments on the NPLs in the banking system. General provisions 
declined by RM553.7 million due to the reduction in the loan base of the banking system. 
Specific provisions outstanding of the banking system remained relatively stable.   
 
 




With regard to resolution of the NPLs of small and medium scale enterprises, progress 
remained relatively slow. BNM launched the Enterprise Program to support viable businesses 
in order to hasten the speed of resolving the SME loans. The program had the following goals: 
(1) Application of standard loan restructuring guidelines with business, and (2) Provision of 
funding support to viable SMEs. New loans extended under the program were partly 
guaranteed by the Government through the Credit Guarantee Corporation Malaysia Berhad. 
The credit risk share was 70% for the Credit Guarantee Corporation Malaysia Berhad and the 
remaining 30% for the lending institutions.     
The strategies implemented in 1998, 1999 and 2000 to strengthen the banking sector, especially   15
the resolution of NPLs in the banking system, have been very difficult to evaluate. There were 
several impacts of the NPL resolution on NPL restructuring aside from the institutional 
arrangements implemented by the Government. Despite the measures undertaken for 
rehabilitation of NPLs prior to 1999, gross NPLs on actual basis in the banking sector had 
turned and begun to rise during the course of 2001. The rate of increase in NPL ratio was 
around 2% in commercial banks. The NPL ratio in merchant banks, however, was incredibly 
high: 21.7% on actual basis, 26.2% on 3-month basis, and 21.6% on 6-month basis. The 
resolution of NPLs in commercial banks and merchant banks was very slow.   
By the end of 2004, the NPL ratio in all commercial banks, finance companies, and merchant 
banks decreased to some extent. The NPL ratio on 3-month basis was 6.8% for commercial 
banks, 11.3% for finance companies, and 19.4% for merchant banks. Although there was the 
NPL ratio in commercial banks, it was difficult to rate the resolution of NPLs in finance 
companies and merchant banks as satisfactory.   16
Table 2-2: Non-performing Loans (as of end of year) 
1996 1997  1998   
1999 2000 
Classification****   
Classification**** Classification**** 
Group of Banks  Actual* Actual*  Actual*      3-month  6-month  Actual*    3-month    6-month  Actual*    3-month     6-month 
Commercial Banks            
Non-performing  loans**  8163.0  14508.0  37253.5       44896.0  32082.0  33451.4     40267.1    29182.6  35441.9     40640.9     31329.5 
Net  NPL  ratio(%)***  3.6  5.0  7.3         9.7  5.9  6.5         8.8       5.4  6.4        8.1         5.3 
Finance companies            
Non-performing  loans**  4002.0  8497.0  17901.3        25122.0  16320.0  14415.2     19073.4    13570.5  14255.4     17725.3     13481.5 
Net  NPL  ratio(%)***  4.7  7.8  14.0        21.8  12.2  9.7         16.3      8.6  9.3         13.4       8.8 
Merchant banks            
Non-performing  loans**  315.0  1039.0  4122.1         7197.0  3888.0  3764.5       5589.9     3487.5  3018.4      4289.7       3059.6 
Net  NPL  ratio(%)***  1.7  4.5  11.5           25.6  10.9  12.7         23.4      12.3  10.5       18.2         10.9 
Banking System            
Non-performing  loans**  12480.0  24044.0  59276.9        77215.0  52294.0  51631.1       64930.3   46240.6  52715.7     62655.8      47870.7 
N e t   N P L   r a t i o ( % ) * * *   3 . 3   5 . 7   9 . 0             1 3 . 2   7 . 6   7 . 4           1 1 . 0         6 . 4   7 . 1          9 . 6           6 . 3  
 
 
Source: Bank Negara Malaysia Annual Report, various issues.   
* Loans classified as NPL based on individual banking institutions' NPL classification policy; i.e. 3-month or 6-month classification.  
** RM million   
*** Net NPL ratio=(NPL less IIS less SP) / (Gross loans less IIS less SP) x 100%. IIS: interest in suspense, SP: special provision  
**** The default period for classifying a loan as non-performing was reduced from six months to three months from January 1 1998, then the default period for classifying a loan as non-performing was lengthened 
from three months to six months from September 1 1998. 
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Table 2-3: Banking System: Loan Loss Provision (RM million)   
June  1997   Dec  1997   December  1998   December  1999    December  2000  
Classification**   Classification**   Classification**  
Group of Banks    Actual*    Actual*    Actual*     3-month     6-month   Actual*      3-month    6-month   Actual*      3-month    6-month 
Commercial Banks 
Interest-in-suspense 
Specific provision   
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 December  2001   December  2002   December  2003   December  2004  
Classification**     Classification**   Classification**   Classification**  
Group of Banks    Actual*       3-month    6-month  Actual*       3-month     6-month   Actual*       3-month   6-month   Actual*     3-month    6-month 
Commercial Banks   
Interest-in-suspense 
Specific provision   
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Source: Bank Negara Malaysia Annual Report, various issues.   
* Loans classified as NPLs based on individual banking institutions' NPL classification policy; i.e. 3-month or 6-month classification.  
** The default period for classifying a loan as non-performing was reduced from six months to three months from January 1 1998, then the default period for classifying a loan as non-performing was 
lengthened from three months to six months from September 1 1998.     18




In terms of major economic sectors, the bulk of the banking system’s NPLs remained 
concentrated in the manufacturing, broad property and consumption credit sectors.   
NPLs in the manufacturing sector peaked in 1998 then declined during 1999. However, the 
level of NPLs grew by 5.6% in 2000, which was still below the level in 1998. The percentage 
share in the total NPLs, however, increased from 16.0% at the end of 1999 to 16.6% at the end 
of 2000, 1.4 points above the level in 1998. The NPLs in the sector were mainly concentrated 
on loans granted to SMEs. Although several measures have been introduced by the 
Government to assist SME borrowers, such as the Enterprise Program, the progress in 
resolution of NPLs in SMEs was relatively slow due to some extent to the slowdown of 
economic recovery.   
The NPLs of the broad property sector included NPLs in construction, purchase of residential 
and non-residential property, and real estate sectors. As of December 2000, the total amount of 
NPLs in the sector increased by RM1717 million and accounted for 39.2% of total NPLs in the 
banking sector. The NPL ratio of the sector grew by 2.5% from 36.7% as of December 1999. 
Considering the contraction in outstanding loans to this sector in the aftermath of crisis, the 
increase in level of NPLs as well as the share in total NPLs should be dealt with as early as 
possible. NPLs in this sector were expected to worsen further, especially when the construction 
sector as a whole was not projected to register a positive growth.       20
NPLs in the consumption credit sector as a whole, however, decreased from 12.6% as of 
end-1999 to 11.9% as of December 2000. The level of NPLs declined by RM247 million to 
RM6261 million at the end of 2000. From December 1998, the gross NPLs for this sector 
declined by 18%.     
Reflecting the negative impact of the world economy on the Malaysian economy, NPLs in 
many sectors increased during 2001. The most severely affected sectors were manufacturing, 
broad property and financial services. The total increase in NPLs in these three sectors from 
2000 to 2001, RM12 billion, accounted for 86% of the total increase in NPLs in the RM14 
billion banking system. Percentage share in total NPLs in manufacturing, broad property and 
financial services rose by about 2% to 18.6%, 41.1%, and 7.9%, respectively. The increase of 
NPLs was mainly due to the persistent economic slowdown and partly due to the effects of 
September 11 on the world economy.   
By the end of 2004, total NPLs in each sector had decreased. However, when the 
percentage share of NPLs was examined individually, it showed an increase in the 
wholesale, retail, hotels & restaurants, as well as the consumption credit sectors. Broad 
property sector had the largest percentage share in NPLs within the banking sector and, in 
addition, it did not show a decrease at all.     21
 
Table 2-4: Non-Performing Loans by Major Economic Sectors in Banking System   
June 1997  Dec 1997  Dec 1998  Dec 1999  Dec 2000  Dec 2001  Dec 2002  Dec 2003  Dec 2004 
Amount  (RM  million)         
Agriculture   320  511   818   691   703  924  933  781  679 
Mining  &  quarrying   48  143   259   231   210  245  159  148  89 
Manufacturing   2733  3441   9018   8273   8733  12410  12509  10001  8616 
Electricity  &  various  services   219  294   934   102   253  359  423  1444  1300 
Broad  Property*   5957  8656   20830   18950   20667  27346  26816  26641  26029 
Wholesale, retail, hotels & restaurants    990  1605    3912    4273    4679  4983  4317  4634  4340 
Transport,  storage  &  communications   290  517   2701   2082   1918  1595  1407  1188  722 
Financial  Services   400  1240   4591   4193   3030  4634  3105  2356  1876 
Securities   323  2780   7524   4746   4581  5207  4373  3750  2894 
Consumption  credit**   2395  4177   7585   6508   6261  5803  5420  2641  2550 
NPL  Total   13906  24044   59277   51631   52716  66617  62316  58272  53726 
Percent Share in total NPLs 
 
Agriculture   2.3  2.1  1.4   1.3   1.3   1.4   1.5   1.3   1.3 
Mining & quarrying    0.3  0.6  0.4    0.4   0.4   0.4   0.3   0.3   0.2 
Manufacturing   19.7  14.3  15.2   16.0   16.6   18.6   20.1   17.2   16.0 
Electricity & various services    1.6  1.2  1.6   0.2   0.5   0.5   0.7   2.5   2.4 
Broad  Property*   42.8  36.0  35.1   36.7   39.2   41.1   43.0   45.7   48.4 
Wholesale, retail, hotels & restaurants    7.1  6.7  6.6   8.3   8.9   7.5   6.9   8.0   8.1 
Transport, storage & communications    2.1  2.2  4.6   4.0   3.6   2.4   2.3   2.0   1.3 
Financial  Services   2.9  5.2  7.7   8.1   5.7   7.0   5.0   4.0   3.5 
Securities   2.3  11.6  12.7   9.2   8.7   7.8   7.0   6.4   5.4 
Consumption credit**    17.2  17.4  12.8    12.6   11.9   8.7   8.7   4.5   4.7 
Source: Bank Negara Malaysia Annual 
Report, various issues.                    
* Construction, Purchase of residential and non-residential 
property, Real estate.                
** Personal uses, Credit cards, Purchase of transport vehicle and commercial vehicles.            





The level of NPLs was substantially lower than those in Thailand and Indonesia. This can be 
attributed to three factors. First, Danaharta, the national asset management company, was 
created in an early stage of the financial crisis, and Danaharta purchased NPLs from financial 
institutions.    23
Second, macroeconomic policy became expansionary in early August 1998,
7 
and some fiscal 
spending resumed much earlier than that in other countries. Third, the classification standard of 
NPLs was relaxed from 3-months overdue to 6-months overdue in September 1998. Since the 
third factor served less substantial purpose, the first and second factors should be credited as 
better crisis management.   
Despite the several measures undertaken for rehabilitation of NPLs prior to 1999, the NPLs in 
the banking system as a whole did not show an improvement: NPLs in most of the financial 
institutions that increased in 1998 turned around and declined in 1999. However, resolution of 
NPLs slowed down during 2000: the actual NPL ratio remained constant, in general. By 
contrast, the increase in NPLs continued in 2001. The NPLs in the banking sector rose 
dramatically by RM13 billion on actual basis from the end of 2000 to the end of 2001. The 
NPL ratio in merchant banks was most striking in that it increased from 10.5% as of the end of 
2000 to 21.7% as of the end of 2001, on actual basis. By the end of 2004, the NPL ratio in the 
banking sector, as well as the financial institutions, decreased significantly.   
Regarding the sectoral breakdown of NPLs, most of the increase in NPLs in the banking system 
came from manufacturing, broad property and financial services. Resolution of NPLs in these 




3. Loan Activities, and Capital Adequacy   
It has been well recognized, especially after the financial turmoil in the region following the 
Thai baht crash and its subsequent contagion effects, that the mismatch between long-term 
capital investments and short-term funding would increase the vulnerability of the banking 
system. To avoid undue pressure on the banking institutions, Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM) 
required in 1999 that any new capital injection performed by the shareholders of banking 
institutions be funded through non-debt sources or extremely long-term debt instruments. In 
addition, banking institutions were no longer allowed to lend to their shareholders with 
controlling and/or influential interest. These new measures complemented the existing rules of 
                                                   
7  Official data released on August 27, 1998 revealed that the economy had slipped into deep 
recession. Therefore, BNM relaxed monetary policy that day. These measures included; (1) 
reduction of BNM intervention rate from 10% to 9.5%, and (2) reduction of statutory reserve 
requirement (SRR) from 8% to 6%.   24
prohibiting banking institutions from lending to their directors and officers. This prohibition 
was aimed at curtailing any potential misuse and irregular practices by the shareholders.     
 
During the Asian financial crisis, it was evident that poor asset quality as well as the absence of 
sound risk management in banking institutions could threaten the solvency of the institutions 
and further threaten economic activities as a whole. It was necessary to establish prudent risk 
management in order to maintain asset quality in the banking system, thereby minimizing the 
risk of potential bank failures. BNM issued guidelines on credit risk management. They 
denoted specific requirements and practices that banking institutions ought to adopt. The 
objectives of the guidelines were to ensure adequate supervision, to control risks in the banking 
institutions, and to include credit exposure measurements, minimum capital funds requirements, 
disclosure requirements, and guidelines on liquidity. Details are in section 5. The limit on credit 
facilities to a single customer was also tightened from 30% to 25% of capital funds.   
Outstanding loans of the banking system, including loans sold to Cagamas and Danaharta, rose 
from RM426.6 billion as of end-1998 to RM431.0 billion as of end-1999 and then to RM454.2 
billion as of end-2000. Including loans written-off and loan conversion into equity, total 
outstanding loans increased by an annual rate of 6.8%.   
No minimum loan growth target was set for the year 2000 by Bank Negara Malaysia. Instead, 
tax incentives were accorded to those banking institutions that registered an annual loan growth 
of 10% or more for the calendar year 2000. For these institutions, net interest income from 
loans and business income derived from Islamic financing activities in excess of 8% would be 
exempted from taxable income. Approximately 25 banking institutions (including two Islamic 
banks) were eligible for the tax incentives.     25
Table 2-5: Loans sold to Danaharta (RM million)   
as of end-1998    as of end-1999    as of end-2000    as of end-2001   
as of end-2002     
Performing   Total  Performing   Total   Performing   Total  Performing   Total  Performing  
Group  of  Banks   NPLs     Loans   Loans  NPLs      Loans   Loans  NPLs      Loans   Loans  NPLs      Loans   Loans  NPLs      Loans  
Commercial  Banks   10571.5   573.7   11145.2  22707.6    6205.4   28913.0  24032.9    6357.4   30660.3  24665.2    6743.0   31408.1  24665.2    6743.0  
Finance companies    763.1     126.9   890.0  3172.2     267.1   3439.3  3536.1     274.3   3810.4  3261.3     274.3   3535.6  3261.3     274.3  
Merchant  Banks   877.5     128.5   1005.9  2757.6     259.6   3017.2  2964.1     286.9   3251.0  2892.4     286.9   3179.3  2863.6     286.9  
Banking  System   12212.    1  829.1   13041.1  28637.4    6732.1   35369.5  30533.1    6918.6   37721.7  30818.9    7304.2   38123.0  30790.1    7304.2  
 
Source: Bank Negara Malaysia Annual Report, various issues.   
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4. Management of Banking Sector 
The liquidity problems with large NPLs in some banking institutions deterred the banking 
institutions on the recovery track from expanded lending activities after the financial crisis in 
1997. The primary objective of Bank Negara Malaysia was to introduce the Two-tier 
Regulatory System (TTRS) for commercial banks in 1994. The system extended to financial 
companies and merchant banks in 1996, as it consolidated the banking industry by way of 
mergers (stronger institutions merged with the weaker ones).
8 
However, in 1997, only three mergers were instituted: DCB Bank with Kwong Yik Bank,
9 
DCB Finance with Kwong Yik Finance, and United Overseas Bank with Chung Khiaw Bank. 
Both DCB Bank and Kwong Yik Bank were tier-1 institutions.
10  The tier-2 system did not 
produce the desired results of consolidation of the banking system by enhancing mergers 
between tier-1 and tier-2 institutions. The tier-2 system did not meet the primary objective; the 
smaller banks in tier-2 instead increased their capital to become tier-1 status. In order to secure 
a sufficient return on capital, several tier-2 banks had been aggressively lending. The Two-tier 
Regulatory System (TTRS) for banking institutions was abolished on April 10, 1999.   
Due to the severe impact of the financial crisis, the Government took stronger measures to 
promote (force) merging of banking institutions. Five finance companies were identified to be 
the anchor companies of mergers. It was envisaged that, by March 31, 1998, the respective 
finance companies should be identified and they would agree on the merger partners as well as 
the terms and conditions of the mergers. However, the effectiveness of this policy remained 
doubtful. The market’s perception was that strong finance companies would suffer as they 
merged with the weaker ones.   
In fact, some banking institutions suffered substantial losses from high levels of NPLs during 
1998. In order to prevent further deterioration of these banking institutions, BNM assumed 
control over the operations of four banking institutions: Kewangan Bersatu Berhad, MBf 
Finance Berhad, Sabah Finance Berhad and Sime Merchant Bankers Berhad. With the 
                                                   
8  Since the mid-1980s, only two market-oriented mergers were successfully implemented, between Kwong 
Yik Bank Berhad and DCB Bank Berhad and between Chung Khiaw Bank (Malaysia) Berhad and United 
Overseas Bank (Malaysia) Berhad. 
9  Rassid Hussain Bank (RHB) was formed out of a merger between DCB Bank and Kwong Yik Bank as the 
second largest bank and later agreed to buy Sime Bank, which suffered a large loss for the second half-year of 
1997.  
10  As of the end of 1997, 10 commercial banks were accorded tier-1 status.   27
exception of MBf Finance Berhad, control over the operations and management of the three 
banking institutions remained under BNM. The three banking institutions were also restricted 
from engaging in new lending activities.     
 
As part of the rescue operations, Kewangan Bersatu Berhad and Sabah Finance Berhad were 
absorbed by Mayban Finance Berhad and Multi-Purpose Bank Berhad, respectively. 
Pengurusan Danaharta Nasional Berhad (Danaharta) was set up in 1998 to manage the 
distressed assets of the banks and institutions prior to the merger. The capital position of MBf 
Finance Berhad was resolved through capital injection amounting to RM2.3 billion in the form 
of tier-1 capital by Danamodal Nasional Berhad (Danamodal). Danamodal also appointed its 
nominees to oversee its investment, as well as to enhance the effectiveness of the board and 
management of MBf Finance Berhad.     
 
Reacting to a worsening situation in the banks, the Government announced that five institutions 
(two banks and three finance companies) should recapitalize in February 1998, based on their 
positions at the end of 1997. On March 3, 1998, BNM revealed that Sime Bank, the country’s 
sixth largest bank, had lost RM1.6 billion (US$420 million) in the second half of the previous 
year and needed US$320 million in new capital. It also disclosed that Bank Bumiputra, the 
second largest bank, needed US$200 million in new capital. BNM also announced that two 
small finance companies were operating in difficulties.   
 
In 1999, two of the larger domestic commercial banks, Bank Bumiputra Malaysia Berhad and 
Sime Bank Berhad, merged. Sime Bank Berhad was taken over by RHB Bank Berhad and 
Bank Bumiputra Malaysia Berhad was absorbed by Bank of Commerce (M) Berhad. These two 
mergers, Sime Bank Berhad and Bank Bumiputra Malaysia Berhad, were completed on June 30 
1999 and September 30 1999, respectively.   
 
Table 4-1: Number of Banks (at the end of reporting year) 
Group of Banks  1996    1997  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002    2003    2004   
Commercial  Banks  37   35   35   33   31   25   24   23  23  
Domestic banks  23   22*  22   20***  17   11   11   10***** 10******  
Foreign banks  14   13**  13   13   14   14   13**** 13 13   
Finance companies  40   39   33   23   19   12   11   11  6  
Merchant  banks  12   12   12   12   12   10   10   10  10  
Source: Bank Negara Malaysia: Annual Report and Financial Sector Stability, The Masterplan, various issues.   
* DCB Bank Berhad and Kwong Yik Bank Berhad were merged in 1997, after which DCB was renamed as RHB Bank Berhad. 
** Chung Khian Bank Berhad (CKB) merged with United Overseas Bank Berhad in 1997. 
*** Sime Bank Berhad was taken over by RHB Bank Berhad on June 30 1999 and 
****Bank Bumiputra Malaysia Berhad was absorbed by Bank of Comemrce Berhad on September 30 1999. 
Overseas Union Bank merged with United Overseas Banjk(malaysia)Berhad with effect from Feb. 2, 2002. 
*****RHBBank Berhad merged with Bank Utama (Malaysia) Berhad with effect from May 1, 2003. 
******Alliance Bank Malaysia Berhad merged with Alliance Finance Berhad with effect from 1 Aug 2004. EON Bank Berhad marged with  
EON Finance Berhad with effect from Nov. 1, 2005. Hong Leong Bank Berhad merged with Hong Leong Finance Berhad with effect from Aug. 1, 2004.   
Malayan Banking Berhad merged with Mayban Finance Berhad with effect from Oct. 1, 2004. Public Bank Nerhad merged with Public Finance Berhad.   28
 
 
<Was the Government-led Merger Plan Successful?> 
The merger program for the finance company industry initiated in 1998 was extended to the 
domestic banking sector as a whole in 1999. On July 27, 1999, it was announced that all 
domestic banking institutions should be restructured so that six banking groups would be 
formed. BNM chose a leader company in each group as an anchor. All banking institutions 
were required to approve the plan by the end of September 1999. There was criticism that the 
grouping and the choice of a leader bank was politically motivated rather than based on 
efficiency. In addition, there remained uncertainty over the impact of mergers on the asset 
quality of the newly formed groups, and particularly on the anchor companies. The six anchor 
companies had their own NPLs, in addition to those of the merger partners. The plan was 
finally frozen at the end of September 1999.   
 
Regarding the unsuccessful plan, the Government announced a new merger plan: all domestic 
banking institutions forming merger groups should choose their own leaders in each group by 
the end of January 200l. In response to this approach, approval was granted for the formation of 
10 banking groups. It was also Government’s intention to avoid the turmoil in financial markets 
due to the drastic reduction of financial institutions. The 10 anchor banks were: Malayan 
Banking Berhad, RHB Bank Berhad, Public Bank Berhad, Bumiputra-Commerce Bank Berhad, 
Multi-Purpose Bank Berhad, Hong Leong Bank Berhad, Perwira Affin Bank Berhad, 
Arab-Malaysian Bank Berhad, Southern Bank Berhad and EON Bank Berhad. Each bank had a   29
minimum of RM2 billion in shareholders’ funds and an asset base of at least RM25 billion. 
Among these 10 anchor banks, the asset quality of Hong Leong Bank Berhad was the market’s 
top concern. With the formation of these 10 banking groups, the number of domestic banking 
institutions reduced substantially to 29 banking institutions (10 commercial banks, 10 finance 
companies and 9 merchant banks).   
By the end of December 2000, progress of the merger program was not functioning as expected. 
Only one banking institution had completed its merger process by March 1, 2000. The other 
institutions were given approval to commence negotiations with other anchor banking groups. 
The merger negotiations of Arab-Malaysian Bank Berhad as an anchor with other banking 
institutions failed. The minimum capital funds unimpaired by losses for domestic banking 
groups were increased to RM2 billion to further strengthen the capital base of the banking 
groups, while foreign banking institutions were required to increase their minimum capital 
funds to RM 300 million by December 31, 2001. By the first quarter of 2001, only one 
domestic banking group and five foreign banking institutions complied with the new minimum 
capital funds requirement.   
 
Initiated in 1999, the merger program for domestic banking institutions was expected to be 
completed by 2000 and was finally executed in 2001. The 10 anchor banks that emerged had to 
comply with all the requirements for anchor bank status, such as minimum capitalization, total 
asset size, and other prudential requirements. The focus of the domestic banking groups entered 
the next stage to complete the business integration processes and rationalization exercises, e.g., 
branch, workforce, etc.     
With regard to mergers, it is essential to understand that the consolidation of the banking 
system cannot be attained through only mergers. Furthermore, it is not clear if there are a 
sufficient number of healthy banks with shareholders who are willing to invest in weaker 
institutions, given the asset quality situation. The process of liberalization to allow entry of 
foreign investors, as well as foreign banks, is restricted. The Government-led strong 
restructuring plan was temporarily necessary during severe times but, as shown in Barth, Cario 
and Levine (2001), the relationship between the tightness of the restrictions placed on bank 
activity and the inefficiency of bank management was important, and the process should be 
directed to market-oriented restructure. Otherwise, the Government-led, and often 
Government-protected, banking system would very likely to be exposed to a banking crisis.     30
For all the debate about the Government-led restructure, the consolidation through mergers 
were still one of the useful strategies. Between 2002 and 2004, there was a series of bank 
mergers. In 2002 and 2003, there were two mergers: Overseas Union Bank merged with United 
Overseas Banjk(malaysia)Berhad with effect from February 2, 2002. RHB Bank Berhad 
merged with Bank Utama (Malaysia) Berhad with effect from May 1, 2003. In 2004, several 
announcements on planned mergers were released. Alliance Bank Malaysia Berhad merged 
with Alliance Finance Berhad with effect from August 1, 2004. EON Bank Berhad merged 
with EON Finance Berhad with effect from November 1, 2004. Hong Leong Bank Berhad 
merged with Hong Leong Finance Berhad with effect from August 1, 2004. Malayan Banking 
Berhad merged with Mayban Finance Berhad with effect from October 1, 2004. Public Bank 
Nerhad was planned to merge with Public Finance Berhad.     31
Table 4-2: Merger Program for Domestic Banking Institutions, as of the end of 2001   
Original Anchor Banking Group    Merged with    Resultant Entity After Merger   
1. Affin Bank Berhad Group      
Perwira Affin Bank Verhad    BSN Commercial Bnak (M) Berhad    Affin Bank Berhad   
Asia Commercial Finance Berhad    BSN Finance Berhad    Affin ACF Finance Berhad   
Perwia Affin Merchant Bank Berhad    BSN Merchant Bankers Berhad    Affin Merchant Bank Berhad   
2. Alliance Bank Berhad Group    International Bank Malaysia Berhad    Alliance Bank Berhad   
Sabah Bank Berhad  Alliance Finance Berhad  Muti-Purpose Bank Berhad 
Sabah Finance Berhad  Alliance Merchant Bank Berhad 
 
Bolton Finance Berhad     
 
Amanah Merchant Bank Berhad     
 
Bumiputra Merchant Bankers Berhad     
3. Arab-Malaysian Bank Berhad Group      
Arab-Malaysian Bank Berhad    Mbf Finance Berhad    Arab-Malaysian Bank Berhad   
Arab-Malaysian Finance Berhad     
Arab-Malaysian Finance Berhad *   
Arab-Malaysian Merchant Bank Berhad     
Arab-Malaysian Merchant Bank Berhad   
4. Bumiputra Commerce Bank Berhad Group      
Bumiputra Commerce Bank Berhad     
Bumiputra Commerce Bank Berhad   
Bumiputra Commerce Finance Berhad     
Bumiputra Commerce Finance Berhad   
Commerce International Merchant Bankers Berhad     
Commerce international Merchant   
  
   Bankers  Berhad  
5. EON Bank Berhad Group      
EON Bank Berhad    Oriental Bank Berhad    EON Bank Berhad   
EON Finance Berhad    City Finance Berhad    EON Finance Berhad   
 
Perkasa Finance Berhad    Malaysian International Merchant   
 
Malaysian  International  Merchant     Bankers  Berhad  
 
Bankers Berhad     
6. Hong Leong Bank Berhad Group      
Hong Leong Bank Berhad    Wah Tat Bank Berhad    Hong Leong Bank Berhad   
Hong Leong Finance Berhad    Credit Corporation Berhad    Hong Leong Finance Berhad   
7. Malayan Banking Berhad Group      
Malayan Banking Berhad    The Pacific Bank Berhad    Malayan Banking Berhad   
Malayan Finance Berhad    PhileoAllied Bank (M) Berhad    Malayan Finance Berhad   
Aseambankers Malaysia Berhad    Sime Finance Berhad    Aseambankers Malaysia Berhad   
 
Kewangan Bersatu Berhad     
8. Public Bank Berhad Group      
Public Bank Berhad    Hock Hua Bank Berhad    Public Bank Berhad   
Public Finance Berhad    Advance Finance Berhad    Public Finance Berhad   
 
Sime Merchant Bankers Berhad    Public Merchant Bank Berhad   
9. RHB Bank Berhad Group      
RHB Bank Berhad    Delta Finance Berhad    RHB Bank Berhad   
RHB Sakura Merchant Bankers Berhad    Interfinance Berhad    RHB Delt Finance Berhad   
  
RHB Sakura Merchant Bankers Berhad   
10. Southern Bank Berhad Group    Ban Hin Lee Bank Berhad    Southern Bank Berhad   
Southern Bank Berhad  United Merchant Finance Berhad    Southern Finance Berhad   
Perdana Finance Berhad    Southern Investment Bank Berhad      Cempaka Finance Berhad     
 
Perdana Merchant Bankers Berhad     
 
Source: Bank Negara Malaysia, Annual Report 2001. 
Note: * Pending completion of business merger with Mbf finance Berhad. 
 
5. Danaharta     32
<Objective>   
Owned by the Ministry of Finance, Pengurusan Danaharta Nasional Berhad (Danaharta) was 
established under the Companies Act 1965 on June 20, 1998. Danaharta’s primary goals were 
to remove bad assets and to undertake strategic investments in financial institutions. 
Danaharta was an asset management company that focused on management of the assets and 
loan restructuring to maximize the recovery value of assets. 
There were a variety of approaches in response to Government assumption of financial losses 
in the banking system.
11  The options were: direct injection of capital into banks in the form of 
subordinated debt; provision of loss-sharing arrangements on some pools of assets; grants of 
Government loans, etc. The advantages and disadvantages of these approaches were 
summarized in Klingebiel (2001). In recent years, countries undergoing crises have used 
publicly-owned asset management companies (AMC). The AMCs can be classified into two 
types. The first type is to help and expedite corporate restructuring, whereas the second type is 
to dispose of assets acquired or transferred to the Government during the crisis. The latter is 
also known as a rapid asset disposition vehicle.   
Danaharta began its acquisition of NPLs in August 1998. As Danaharta moved from the 
establishment phase to the management phase, the composition of its NPLs also changed from 
unresolved to recovery-processed NPLs. Based on the current pace of resolution, Danahrta had 
been on track to achieve its targeted unwinding by 2005. 
 <Operations>  
To encourage banks to sell their NPLs to Danaharta, Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM) provided 
several incentives, as follows: (1) Banking institutions with a gross NPL ratio exceeding 10% 
were required to sell all their eligible NPLs to Danaharta; otherwise, (2) banking institutions 
would have to write down the value of these loans by 20% below the price Danahrta 
offered and restructure them; (3) BNM allowed banking institutions to amortize losses 
resulting from the sale to Danaharta up to five years; (4) Profit sharing arrangements 
between Danaharta and the selling institution are as follows: Danaharta would share any 
surplus recovery (after deducting recovery and holding cost) from the sale of the 
                                                   
11  For discussion and survey on banking sector restructuring through public funds, including setting up AMC 
and direct capital injection, see Enoch, Garcia and Sundararajan (2001).   33
loans/assets with the selling institutions on a 80:20 (selling institution:Danaharta) basis.     
 
 
Table 5-1: Danaharta   
Danaharta: Asset management and disposition   
 
<Asset valuation and selection>   
Danaharta purchased NPLs that had minimum gross values of at least RM5 million.
12 Any 
security associated with the loan was also transferred to the AMC. Danaharta pays a “fair 
market value” for the loans. The fair market value was the purchase price determined by 
Danaharta. Loans could be acquired with or without recourse, and payment periods could be 
varied as needed.   
 
Danaharta indicated that only loans that had value or the potential for value were selected for 
acquisition.
13 Small loans, such as consumer loans and credit cards would be left out. 
Danaharta looked at all loans held by financial institutions in the country. There was no 
obligation for any institution to sign an agreement with the AMC, although banking institutions 
                                                   
12  NPLs under RM5 million are to be sold to a special-purpose vehicle. 
13  Asset acquisition guideline, in 2. Criteria, “The assets acquired must have value.”    34
that received capital assistance from Danamodal were required to sell their eligible NPLs to 
Danaharta.  
 
Pricing of loans and the asset acquisition process are important. Private analysts were 
concerned about Danaharta’s ability to determine a fair market value given the thin markets and 
uncertain times. While banks were supposed to voluntarily sell their loans to Danaharta, the 
market believed that banks would be forced to provide the most-likely-to-attract-buyers NPLs 
at discounted values to Danaharta. On the other hand, banks would be left with many bad NPLs 
that were unrecoverable at any time.   
 
<Loan and Asset Management>   
At the end of December 1998, Danaharta acquired RM8.11 billion from financial institutions 
and was managing RM11.62 billion in NPLs from Sime Bank Group and Bank Bumiputra 
Malaysia Berhad Group on behalf of Bank Negara Malaysia and the Government of Malaysia. 
The total loan rights amounted to RM19.73 billion. The overall weighted average discount rate 
for the acquired NPLs was about 61%.
14 
 
At the end of June 1999, Danaharta acquired RM17.79 billion from financial institutions and 
was managing RM21.54 billion of NPLs in respect of Sime Bank Group and Bank Bumiputra 
Malaysia Berhad Group. Total NPLs under Danaharta’s management amounted to RM39.33 
billion. The overall weighted average discount rate for the acquired NPLs was about 57%.   
 
As of December 31, 1999, the NPLs with loan rights under the management of Danaharta 
amounted to RM45.5 billion, of which RM26.39 billion was the loan right of Sime Bank 
Group and Bank Bumiputra Malaysia Berhad Group. The removal of these NPLs from the 
banking sector reduced the residual NPL level to 6.6% (based on 6-month classification) as 
of end-December 1999, from the peak of 9% (based on 6-month classification) as of 
end-November 1998. The overall weighted average discount rate for the acquired NPLs 







                                                   
14  Discount rate is defined as the Danaharta purchase value divided by book value of selling institutions.     35
5-2: Loans sold to Danaharta (RM million) 
       end-1998             end-1999         end-2000       
Group of Banks    NPLs  Performing Loans    Total 
Loans  NPLs   Performing  Loans  Total 
Loans  NPLs   Performing  Loans   Total 
Loans 
Commercial Banks    10571.5  573.7  11145.2 22707.6 6205.4 28913 24032.9 6357.4  30660.3
Merchant Banks    763.1  126.9  890 3172.2 267.1 3439.3 3536.1 274.3  3810.4
Finance Companies  877.5  128.5  1005.9 2757.6 259.6 3017.2 2964.1 286.9  3251
Banking System  12212.1  829.1  13041.1 28637.4 6732.1 35369.5 30533.1 6918.6  37721.7
                              
       end-2001         end-2002          
Group of Banks    NPLs  Performing Loans    Total 
Loans  NPLs   Performing  Loans  Total 
Loans      
Commercial Banks    24665.2  6743  31408.1 24665.2 6743 31408.1      
Merchant Banks    3261.3  274.3  3535.6 3261.3 274.3 3535.6      
Finance Companies    2892.4  286.9  3179.3 2863.6 286.9 3150.5      
Banking System  30818.9  7304.2  38123 30790.1 7304.2 38094.2      
Source: Bank Negara Malaysia Annual Report, various issues. 
  
 
Danaharta embarked on asset management and disposition in 1999. When Danaharta acquired 
an NPL, Danaharta first assessed the viability of the loan. Borrowers with viable loans 
restructured them using Danaharta’s loan management guidelines. Danaharta gave the borrower 
only one opportunity in implementing a scheme in order to prevent borrowers from making 
revisions once the scheme was implemented. Non-viable loans were placed under asset 
management. Borrowers who failed to produce restructuring proposals which were 
acceptable to Danaharta, or failed to comply with the loan restructuring guidelines, were 
also transferred to asset management. Asset management involved the sale of a borrower’s 
business or the collateral of an NPL. The sale of property was carried out by either open 
tender or private contract. Foreign currency loans (non-ringgit loans and marketable   36
securities extended to or issued by foreign borrowers) were disposed by way of Restricted 
Tender Exercise. The management and disposition of loans are shown in the chart below.   
 
The market was concerned that Danaharta might take an unduly long time to maximize the 
value of the assets purchased and in the process hold on to those assets until the domestic 
economy would revive, given the slow recovery of economy as well as the slow process of 
liberalization to allow entry of foreign investors. There were still some concerns as to the 
ability of Danaharta to function independently without Government interference. As an asset 
purchase consideration, Danaharta paid cash and/or issued zero-coupons with 
Government-guarantee. Danaharta managed NPLs of Sime Bank Group and Bank Bumiputra 
Malaysia Berhad Group on behalf of Bank Negara Malaysia and the Government of Malaysia.   
As of December 31, 1999, the recovery rate on average for the loans was about 80%, but the 
recovery rate for foreclosed properties was only 48%.
15 
At the end of June 2000, Danaharta was managing NPLs with loan rights amounting to 
RM46.77 billion from the financial system, of which RM20.5 billion was the loan rights 
acquired from the banking system and the rest of RM26.3 billion was assets managed on behalf 
of Bank Negara Malaysia and the Government of Malaysia. The overall weighted average 
discount rate for the acquired NPLs was about 55%. The recovery rate for the loans reduced to 
73% on average. The recovery rate for foreclosed properties remained at 48%.   
 
As of December 31 2000, Danaharta had acquired RM20.4 billion in NPLs from financial 
institutions and was managing RM27.1 billion in NPL loan rights for Sime Bank Group and 
Bank Bumiputra Malaysia Berhad Group. The book value of the loans removed from the 
banking system was RM37.5 billion, representing 44% of the NPLs in the banking system. On 
December 31 2000, the net NPL ratio of the banking system was moderated to 6.3% based on 
the 6-month classification, from its peak of 9% as of end-November 1998. The weighted 
average discount rate for the acquired NPLs by Danaharta remained relatively constant, at 55% 
as of end-December 2000. The recovery rate declined on average by 7 basis points to 66%. The 
recovery rate for foreclosed loans was 28%, reduced by 20 basis points from the preceding 
period. 
                                                   
15  Recovery rate is defined as the sold value divided by book value of selling institutions.   37
As of end-June 2001, Danaharta had acquired NPLs of RM20.1 billion from financial 
institutions and was managing NPLs of RM27.9 billion with respect to Sime Bank Group and 
Bank Bumiputra Malaysia Berhad Group. The weighted average discount rate for the acquired 
NPLs by Danaharta remained constant at 55%. The recovery rate for NPLs was 57%, reduced 
by 9 basis points from the preceding period. The recovery rate for foreclosed loans remained 
extremely low at 28%.   
Danaharta entered into the loan and asset management stage in 1999. As of December 31, 2000, 
Danaharta had restructured RM35.8 billion of loans (representing approximately 74% of loans 
under its portfolio), with expected recoveries of RM23.8 billion. This amount translated into a 
66% recovery rate of outstanding loans.   
Danaharta did not make direct purchases from the banking institutions in 2001. As of 
December 2001, total loan rights acquired and managed by Danaharta amounted to RM47.7 
billion, of which RM39.8 billion was from the banking system. This accounted for 
approximately 40% of the total non-performing loans of the banking sector. The discount rate 
for the acquired NPLs by Danahrta was 54%, 1 percentage point lower than the previous 3 
years. The recovery rate for NPLs remained almost constant at 56%.   38
Table 5-3: Non-Performing Loans in Danaharta's Portfolio   
Dec 1998  June 1999  Dec 1999  June 2000  Dec 2000    June 2001    Dec 2001  Dec 2002  Dec 2003  Dec 2004   
RM billion  RM billion  RM billion  RM billion  RM billion    RM billion    RM billion  RM billion  RM billion  RM billion 
Acquired*   8.11  17.79  19.13  20.50  20.39   20.13  19.82  19.82  19.73  19.71 
Managed**   11.62  21.54  26.39  26.27  27.10   27.90  27.90  27.94  27.97  27.97 
Total   19.73  39.33  45.52  46.77  47.49   48.03  47.72  47.76  47.70  47.68 
Discount rate (%)    61  57  56  55  55    55  54  54  58  55 
Gross Value of restructured       15.05 28.70 35.83    40.89 50.94  52.5  52.4  52.4 
(Loan Recovery)       12.06 21.08 23.80    23.21 28.51  30.19  30.6  30.8 
Recovery rate (%)       80 73 66    57 56  58 58  59 
  Performing loans       100 100 100            
  Plain restructuring       89 94 93    66 69  79 80  95 
Viable Scheme  arrangement       81 88 83    78 76  74 74  75 
Settlement      87 73 77    76 76  77 81  77   
Average      89  89  88    73  74  77  78  82 
  Foreclosure      48 48 28    28 29  34 34  35 
Others       43 55    42 60  55  56 48  Non-viable 
Average      48  46  42    35  45  45  45  42 
Source: Danaharta Operations Report, various issues.   
* Assets for which acquisition agreements have been signed.   
** Assets managed on behalf of Bank Negara Malaysia and the Government of Malaysia.   
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<Tenders>  
Asset management involves the sale of a borrower’s business or the collateral of an NPL.
16 
The sale of property is carried out mainly by restricted tender exercise (RTE) to dispose foreign 
currency loans and by open tender to manage collateral.   
 
Restricted Tender Exercise 
Danaharta has conducted restricted tender exercise (RTE) to dispose foreign currency loans, i.e. 
non-ringgit loans and marketable securities extended to or issued by foreign borrowers. As of 
June 30, 2001, Danaharta had completed three RTEs—in August 1999, December 1999, and 
September 2000—involving 88 offered accounts worth US$394.2 million in principal value, of 
which 63 accounts were sold with a total consideration value of US$291.9 million. The average 
recovery rate of these three tenders was approximately 65%.   
 
Under the initial tender exercise, Danaharta achieved a recovery rate of 55.3% on 13 of the 
accounts. The second RTE involved 28 accounts with a total value of US$251.8 million. 
Danaharta received US$169.3 million from 25 accounts with a recovery rate of 71%. With 
these two tender exercises, Danaharta disposed foreign currency assets with a principal value of 
US$339.8 million. The average recovery rate for the first and second RTEs was 66%. The third 
RTE involved 45 accounts with a total value of US$168.81 million. Danaharta received a total 
consideration of US$66.3 million, in 29 out of the 45 accounts. The average loan recovery rate 
for the third RTE was 65%.   
 
The fourth RTE in November 2004 involved 12 accounts with a principal value of US$124.4 
million, of which only one account was successfully sold. The average loan recovery rate 








                                                   
16  Asset management by Danaharta involves not only the sale of a borrower’s business or 
collateral of an NPL, but also the appointment of Special Administrators (SAs) over companies. 
The SAs would formulate workout proposal for the companies for which they are responsible 
through a variety of options, including restructuring by the borrower, rescue by a third party 
investor, sale of assets, and if all else, fails liquidation.   40
Table 5-4: Restricted Tender (foreign loans disposals) 
 August  1999   December  1999   August  2000   November  2004    
Offer Sold    Offer Sold    Offer Sold    Offer Sold   
No. of accounts    15 13    28 25  45 29  12 1   
Principal value*    142.5 95.0    251.8 244.8  168.8 102.0  124.4 109.7   
Received*   52.4   173.2  66.3  16.6  
Recovery rate (%)**    55.3    71.0  65.0  13.4   
Source: Danaharta Operations Report, various issues.   
* US$ million   
** Based on principal value   
 
Open tender 
Danaharta also sells property under its management by ways of open tender. Properties are 
offered for sale at their respective indicative values based on the latest independent valuations 
of the properties.
17  The unsold properties are transferred to Danaharta Hartanah Sdn Berhad, a 
property management subsidiary. These properties are subsequently re-offered to the market.     
 
Danaharta conducted its first open tender exercise involving foreclosed properties from 
November 19 to December 9 in 1999. Out of the 44 properties opened for the tender with 
indicative value of RM122.6 million, 24 bids were sold for a total consideration of RM17.8 
million. The amount received on the successful bids represented an 8% surplus over the 
indicative value of RM16.5 million. The remaining 20 properties with an indicative value of 
RM106.1 million were transferred to an asset subsidiary of Danaharta at the minimum bid price. 
From March 29 to April 28 in 2000, the second open tender was conducted, offering 123 
properties with indicative value of RM276.4 million. Among the properties offered, 69 bids 
were sold for a total of RM106.5 million, representing 2% surplus over the indicative value of 
RM104.2 million.   
 
With regard to the property open tenders conducted by Danaharta, five tenders had been 
conducted by the end of December 2001. A total of 614 properties with indicative value of 
RM1435.1 million had been offered to the market since the first tender in November 1999. As 
of December 2001, Danaharta had sold 498 properties in both the primary and secondary sale. 
Of these, 357 properties had been sold for a total consideration of RM593.3 million in 
primary sales and 141 properties (RM250.2 million) in secondary sale. Properties that were 
not sold during the tenders (primary sale) were transferred to Danaharta Hartanah Sdn Bhd 
and would be re-offered to the market for secondary sales.   
As of the end of 2001, the surplus in the primary sale lowered to 4.0% from 7.0% at the end of 
                                                   
17  Indicative value is “based on an independent professional valuation of each property prior to a tender. It 
reflects the current market value of the property at the point of valuation.” Operations Report, Danaharta.   41
July 2001. Between July 5, 2001 and December 31, 2001, the Sales & Purchase Agreements of 
eight properties, with total indicative value of RM64.1 million did not meet certain conditions. 
As of July 2001, they were classified as “Sold to successful bidders in tenders” but are now 
reclassified as “Unsold in tenders”. This caused a decrease in the number of properties sold in 
the primary sale from 364 properties (as of July 2001) to 357 (as of December 2001).     
Properties that do not attract bids above the minimum prices set by Danaharta in each tender 
are transferred to Danaharta Hartanah at the minimum price via an automatic bid mechanism. 
These unsold properties are subsequently re-offered to the market (“secondary sales”). These 
secondary sales can be conducted in a variety of ways, including sale by private contract (direct 
negotiation between Danaharta Hartanah and a prospective buyer) or by offering the properties 
in the next open tender, together with other newly foreclosed properties.   
A total of 257 properties unsold in the primary sale were offered to the secondary market as of 
the end of 2001. Among them, 141 properties were sold, of which 97 were sold via private 
contract and 44 were in subsequent tenders. The total consideration of received amounted to 
RM250.2 million, representing approximately 78% of indicative value of RM320.5 million. 
The percentage of property sold in the secondary sale gradually increased from 37% as of the 
end of 2000 to 55% as of the end of 2001. This is partly due to the increasing number of 
properties offered in the secondary sale.   
As of the end of 2003, a total of 511 unsold properties from the primary sales had been 
transferred to Danaharta Hartanah. Of these, a total of 269 properties were eventually sold via 
private contract sales or through Danaharta’s subsequent property tenders amounting to 
RM543.8 million. This represented 79.6% of the indicative value of RM683.4 million. The rest 
of 242 properties remained unsold even in the secondary sales and would further be transferred 
to other sales. The percentage of property sold in the secondary sale was about 53%.   
In sum, although properties sold in the primary sales represented surplus over the indicative 
value, the percentage sold was only 60%. Among re-offered properties for secondary sales, 
only 40% were sold with less than 80% of the indicative value. Another alarming signal was 
the significant drop of the surplus rate in the primary sale to 1% at the end of 2003. This means 
that there had been a growing number of properties unsold in the tender. Not only was it getting 
difficult to sell all the accounts offered in the primary sale, but the quality of the properties was   42
also not as high as it had been. In total, properties sold in both primary and secondary sales 
generated consideration value of RM1707.6 million as of December 2003, with indicative value 
of RM1831.2 million. Other properties, unsold or withdrawn from sales, remained within 
Danaharta Hartanah’s portfolio.   
The composition of Danaharta’s assets would change over time from unresolved NPLs to 
various asset groups and ultimately into cash. As Danaharta moved from its establishment 
phase to its management phase, the composition of its NPLs also changed from being 
unresolved to ongoing resolving NPLs.     43
Table 5-5: Open tenders by Danaharta (RM million)   
As of December 1999    As of December 2000    As of July 2001     
N o .   o f         Indicative  
accounts         value     Received  
N o .   o f          Indicative  
a c c o u n t s           v a l u e      Received  
N o .   o f      Indicative  
accounts     value   Received 
Offer*   44              122.      6   449**           985.9   613***     1432.9    
Sold*   24              16.5     17.8   325             562.2     535.0   468         845.4   840.2 
Primary  sale*   24              16.5     17.8   253             405.2     410.3   364         630.3   675.7 
Secondary  sale*   ---  72              157.0     124.8   104          215.1   166.3 
Sold  in  the  primary  sale  (%)   54.5   56.3   59.4    
Surplus  in  the  primary  sale  (%)   8.0   1.0   7.0    
 
As of Dec 2001    As of Dec 2002    As of Dec 2003     
N o .   o f      Indicative  
accounts     value  Received 
N o .   o f      Indicative  
accounts     value  Received  
N o .   o f      Indicative  
accounts     value  Received 
Offer*   614       1435.1     890        2312.4     1093       2796.2    
Sold*   498       888.9   843.5  745        1443.3   1392.0  851        1831.2   1707.6 
Primary  sale*   357       568.4   593.3  550         983.1   1043.9  582        1147.8   1163.8 
Secondary  sale*   141       320.5   250.2  195         460.2   348.1  269         683.4   543.8 
Sold in the primary sale (%)    58.1      61.8     53.2    
Surplus in the primary sale (%)    4.0      6.0      1.0     
Source: Danaharta Operations Report, various issues.   
*Since the first tender in November 1999   
**Include 3 properties unsold in tenders   
***Includes 1 property in tender   
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Table 5-6: Results of secondary sales (RM million)   
As of December 2000     
As of July 2001      
As of December 2001       
N o .   o f        I n d i c a t i v e   
accounts      value  (A)  Received  (B)  B/A (%) 
N o .   o f           I n d i c a t i v e   
a c c o u n t s            v a l u e    Received B/A  (%) 
No.  of          Indicative  
accounts         value     received
B/A 
(%)  
Total  Re-offered*   193           577.1    
2 4 8                8 0 1 . 0      
2 5 7              8 6 6 . 7     
Sold*   72            157.0       124.8   79  104               215.1   166.3  77  141             320.5      250.2  78
    S o l d   v i a   p r i v a t e   c o n t r a c t    4 1              4 4 . 0         3 5 . 6    8 1   6 0                  9 4 . 8    6 9 . 7   7 4   9 7               2 0 0 . 1       153.55 77
    S o l d   i n   s u b s e q u e n t   t e n d e r s    3 1             1 1 3 . 1         8 9 . 2    7 9   4 4                 1 2 0 . 3    9 6 . 6   8 0   4 4               1 2 0 . 3        96.63  80 
Unsold  or  withdrawn  from  sale*   121           420.1    
1 4 4                5 8 5 . 9      
1 1 6              5 4 6 . 3     
Sold in the secondary sale (%)    37.3     
41.9     
54.9    
 
As of Dec 2002    
As of Dec 2003      
N o .   o f        I n d i c a t i v e   




value   Received B/A  (%) 
Total  Re-offered*   290          893.8     
290 893.8      
Sold*   195          460.2   348.1  76  215  546.7   366.1  73
    Sold  via  private  contract   102          252.0   191.16  76  116  315.9   226.75  72
    Sold  in  subsequent  tenders   93           208.2   156.92  76  99  230.8   170.55  74 
Unsold or withdrawn from sale*    95      
75      
Sold in the secondary sale (%)    67.2      
74.1      
Source: Danaharta Operations Report, various issues.   
*Since the first tender in November 1999     45
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6. Danamodal   
<Establishment>  
Danamodal Nasional Berhad (Danamodal) was incorporated on August 10, 1998 as a 
wholly-owned subsidiary of Bank Negara Malaysia. By the statement on the establishment of 
the special purpose vehicle (SPV) to recapitalize and consolidate the banking sector on July 13, 
1998, Bank Negara Malaysia announced the details of the establishment of the SPV to 
spearhead the recapitalization and restructuring of domestic banking institutions. The SPV was 
incorporated and known as Danamodal and commenced its operations in September 1998.   
 
Danamodal was formed as a limited liability corporation. When it was first established, Bank 
Negara Malaysia provided the initial seed capital of RM1.5 billion. In the worst case scenario, 
Bank Negara Malaysia estimated that RM16 billion would have been required to bring the risk 
weighted capital ratio of all domestic banking institutions to at least 9%. These funds were 
raised in the form of equity, hybrid instruments, or debt in both the domestic and international 
markets. Danamodal tried to broaden its shareholder base by inviting the participation of   47
supranational/multilateral agencies and other institutional investors, both domestic and foreign. 
Bank Negara Malaysia aimed to work closely with Danamodal and Danaharta to ensure a 
well-coordinated capital raising program.   
 
The setting up of Danamodal was expected to play an important role in facilitating the 
consolidation and rationalization of banking institutions. The recapitalization and consolidation 
expedited the formation of a core group of domestic banking institutions which were not only 
well capitalized but were also efficient and competitive. An efficient and competitive banking 
system was essential to increase confidence and stimulate the real economy, as well as increase 
the financial sector’s own contribution to GDP growth. Danamodal also coordinated its 
activities with Danaharta and with domestic banking institutions in their initiatives to restore 
their capital, liquidity, and profitability position. Danamodal was closed in 2003.       
 
<Objective>  
The objectives of Danamodal were to (1) recapitalize and strengthen the banking industry; and 
(2) help facilitate the consolidation and rationalization of the banking system to support the 
next phase of economic development.   
 
Danamodal was expected to operate under the existing regulatory and supervisory 
framework and aimed to minimize the use of public funds. In order to minimize the tax 
payers’ burden, it was aimed to operate based on commercial and market-oriented 
principles and to ensure equitable burden sharing among stockholders.     
 
<Operation>  
Banking institutions were required to submit their recapitalization plans under various 
operations and NPL scenarios. Danamodal then assessed the financial health as well as 
long-term viability of those banking institutions.   
 
In identifying the banking institutions that required capital injections, Danamodal implemented 
standards developed by BNM. Similarly, to identify institutions that required recapitalization, 
Danamodal established objective guidelines. Steps to be followed included, but were not be 
limited to: (i) in-depth analysis of the competitive position and financial standing of each 
banking institution; (ii) quantification of potential synergies to be realized through 
consolidation; and (iii) CAMEL (capital, assets, management, earnings, liquidity) analysis.   
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Banking institutions receiving capital injection had to meet several conditions such as: (i) the 
submission of a thorough business plan; (ii) monthly reporting; and (iii) the establishment of a 
comprehensive list of performance targets.   
Danamodal only injected capital into banking institutions after the institutions had sold their 
NPLs to Danaharta, whereby the existing shareholders would have to bear the losses from the 
sales. Danamodal only recapitalized viable banking institutions based on the assessment and the 
diligent review conducted by reputable, international financial advisors. The capital injection 
was in the form of equity or hybrid instruments. In making its investment decisions, 
Danamodal used market-based principles and methodologies. Once the capital injection was 
carried out, Danamodal instituted micro reforms through its nominees appointed to the 
respective boards of these banking institutions.   
<Capital Injection >   
The recapitalization process took four steps: (1) assessing recap requirements,   
(2) recapitalization and investment, (3) financing of recapitalization, and (4) restructuring and 
monitoring stages.     
In the case of recapitalization exercised by Danamodal, total capital injection into the initial 10 
banking institutions declined from RM6.4 billion to RM5.3 billion at the end of December 
1999, following repayments by five banking institutions.   
Danamodal has made no additional capital injection since 2000. Eight banking institutions 
repaid their loans to Danamodal amounting to RM3.4 billion, bringing the outstanding amount 
of capital injection to RM3.7 billion on January 31, 2001. As a result of the merger process, 
two banking institutions repaid their loans to Danamodal. Danamodal still holds stakes in some 
banking institutions and also redeems its bonds amounting to RM11 billion that matured in 
2003. As of November 2003, all the banking institutions except RHB Bank Berhad completed 
the repayment of their loans to Danamodal.   49
Table 6-1 Recapitalization by Danamodal (RM million)   
   Dec  31,  1999   Dec 22, 2000    Dec 20, 2001    Nov 5, 2003   
 Injection  Repayment Balance  Injection  Repayment Balance  Injection  Repayment Balance  Injection Repayment Balance 
RHB  Bank  Berhad    1500  500 1000 1500 500 1000    1500 500 1000 1500  500 1000   
Arab-Malaysian Bank Berhad    800  0 800 800 340 460    800 340 460 800 800  0   
MBf  Finance  Berhad    1600  0 1600 2280 0 2280    2280 1600  680 2280 2280  0   
United Merchant Finance Berhad  800  800 0  800 800 0    800 800  0 800 800  0   
Oriental Bank Berhad    700  0 700 700 0 700    700 700  0 700 700  0   
Arab-Malaysian Finance Berhad    500  500 0  500 500 0    500 500  0 500 500  0   
BSN Commercial Bank Berhad    420  0  420  420 420  0    420 420  0  420  420  0   
Arab-Malaysian Merchant Berhad  400  400 0  400 400 0    400 400  0 400 400  0   
Sabah  Bank    140 140  0 140 140  0    140 140  0 140 140  0   
Perdana Merchant Bankers    50  0 50 50 50 0    50 50 0  50  50 0   
Total   6910  2340 4570 7590 3150 4440    7590 5450 2140 7590 6590 1000   
Source: Danamodal, Press Release.     50
7. Corporate Debt Restructuring Committee (CDRC)   
<Objective>  
The Corporate Debt Restructuring Committee (CDRC) was established in July 1998 to provide 
a platform for both the borrowers and creditors to work out feasible debt restructuring 
schemes.
18 On October 28, 1998, the procedures and guidelines for the operations of the 
Corporate Debt Restructuring Committee (CDRC) were unveiled and CDRC initiated its 
operation.  
 
CDRC was set up so that the borrowers would be able to direct their debt restructuring to 
CDRC without having to resort to legal proceedings.
19 CDRC assisted in the restructuring of 
debts of viable companies with total aggregate debts of at least RM50 million from more than 
one financial institution. In addition, the Government also established several special funds. 
These special funds included the Fund for Small and Medium Industries (RM11.5 billion), the 
Special Scheme for Low and Medium Cost Houses (RM2 billion) and the Rehabilitation Fund 
for Small and Medium Industries (RM750 million). The Rehabilitation Fund for Small and 
Medium Industries was established to provide financial assistance to viable small- and 
medium-sized industries that were facing NPLs and temporary cash flow problems. The 
progress of corporate debt restructuring was deemed to be finalized and, therefore, CDRC was 
closed in August 2002. 
                                                   
18  Firms in the crisis countries of East Asia were heavily indebted. Despite weak creditor protection, they 
were highly leveraged before the crisis, partly because of the even weaker protection for outside equity 
holders. See La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2000). Corporate statistics and the auction procedure 
of Asian countries are summarized in Hausch and Ramachandran (2001). 
19  The case of bankruptcy brought into court: The bankruptcy laws and their effectiveness of enforcement 
vary across countries. When the legal rights of creditors are well protected, firms’ access to credit expands 
substantially and therefore, improving creditors’ rights amounts to a sound strategy to develop credit markets. 
However, reforming creditors’ rights can prove politically treacherous in that the bankruptcy reform may be 
more complicated. It is also difficult from the viewpoint of political expediency as well as fairness. See Hart 
et al. (1997) and La Porta and Lopez-de-Silanes (2001) for details. The latter analyzes some of the recent 
failed reform attempts and suggests a more viable option to reform bankruptcy law that relies on a market-run 
procedure using auctions. This option is found to be appropriate in countries with weak judicial systems.   51
<Operations>  
CDRC did not have legal power. It only provided an informal framework outside court 
proceedings. If the process under CDRC could not obtain consensus among the banking 
institutions, Danaharta would assist by buying over these NPLs from the dissenting banking 
institutions, thereby facilitating the restructuring process. The debt restructuring approach by 
CDRC could not and did not guarantee the survival of businesses. The approach to corporate 
debt restructuring was premised upon co-operation between the stakeholders through which the 
mutual interests of both debtor and creditors could be addressed in a mutually collaborative 
environment.   
 
CDRC assisted in restructuring debts of viable companies with total aggregate debt of 
approximately RM50 million or more from more than one financial institution. Below are 
the five stages in a CDRC workout process:   
(1) Initial meetings of debtors and creditors to consider debt restructuring exercise 
and to obtain temporary standstill. Creditors’ Committee was formed and a Lead 
Creditor was identified.   
(2) Consultants were appointed when necessary.   
(3) Consultants to conduct initial review and report on findings on the viability of 
the business and their recommendations therein.   
(4) If restructuring exercise proceeded, a formal standstill should be executed 
amongst the creditors, and consultants should formulate strategies for restructuring.   
(5) Implementation of strategies.   
 
Because CDRC did not have legal powers and as all legal rights of the parties coming to CDRC 
were preserved, it was critical that all parties voluntarily agreed to abide by the guidelines set.     
 
<Restructuring>  
With regard to the corporate debt restructuring exercise, the CDRC received submission of 65 
applications with total debt value of RM35.6 billion from companies at the end of 1999. 
Among those, 15 cases with debt of RM3.5 billion were rejected. CDRC completed the 
restructuring of 13 cases with debts amounting to RM12 billion. At the end of February 2000, 
CDRC completed the restructuring of 19 cases with debts amounting to RM14.1 billion, while 
10 cases were referred to Danaharta. CDRC expected to complete the debt restructuring of 26 
cases involving outstanding debts amounting to RM16.4 billion by the third quarter of 2000.   
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As of December 31, 2000, there were 75 applications to the CDRC, with debts amounting to 
RM47.2 billion. CDRC resolved debts of 42 companies amounting to RM27.3 billion. It also 
withdrew or rejected 21 cases with debts of RM7.8 billion. Therefore, at the end of December 
2000, CDRC had 12 outstanding cases to be resolved with total debts of RM12.1 billion.     
The progress of corporate debt restructuring was relatively slower than expected, given the 
following factors: (i) larger number of creditors involved in the debt restructuring exercises; (ii) 
the need to obtain 100% consensus from the parties; and (iii) the lackluster performance of the 
capital markets in recent months, resulting in difficulties for some borrowers to implement their 
debt restructuring schemes.   
In order to accelerate the pace of corporate debt restructuring, several changes were made to the 
CDRC debt restructuring framework. In previous years, the size and complexity of the cases 
referred to the CDRC became increasingly difficult to deal with. Therefore, several changes 
were introduced to the CDRC framework to facilitate and expedite the restructuring efforts in 
August 2001. The criteria for acceptance of loans to participate in a restructuring exercise under 
the CDRC were also changed to be eligible only to cases which involved an aggregate 
borrowing of RM100 million, compared to the previous RM50 million, and for the borrower to 
have exposure to at least five creditor banks as opposed to two creditor banks in previous years.   
Under the revised framework, CDRC targeted to resolve 10 cases with total debts of RM10.2 
billion between August 1 and December 31, 2001. At the end of December 2001, CDRC 
resolved eight of these cases, with debts accounting for 83.5% of the total targeted amount. In 
total, CDRC resolved 11 cases in the year 2001, involving debts amounting to RM11.9 
billion.
20 
<Closure of the CDRC> 
In a press conference held on August 20, 2002, the closure of the CDRC dated August 15, 2002, 
was announced. The Governor of Bank Negara Malaysia stated that the closure of CDRC 
marked a major milestone achieved in the restructuring process of the banking system. CDRC, 
together with Danaharta and Danamodal, comprised the institutional arrangements that were 
put in place to resolve the problems of non-performing loans in the banking system that 
                                                   
20  The CDRC would be wound up in July 2002 having achieved its objectives. (Comments from Bank 
Negara Malaysia.)   53
emerged during the Asian financial crisis.   
 
The objective of CDRC, in corporation with Danaharta and Danamodal, to preserve stability 
and to enhance the effectiveness and competitiveness of the banking system was complemented 
by various measures. The banking sector consolidated from 69 institutions prior to the crisis, to 
30 institutions post-merger. At the end of June 2002, the level of capitalization of the banking 
system improved to 12.8%. Non-performing loans of the banking sector stabilized at 8.1%. 
Lending activities of the banking sector had continued to increase, with loan approvals and 
disbursements recording strong growth of 10% and 7%, respectively, at the end of June 2002, 
compared to the corresponding period in 2001.   
 
As to the corporate restructuring, the progress was headed for a successful conclusion. As of 
August 15, 2002, CDRC had resolved 47 cases with total debts amounting to RM43.971 billion. 
This included the debt restructuring of Land & General property which was approved by its 
foreign bondholders on August 13, 2002. In total, the resolved cases represented approximately 
65% of the total cases under the auspices of the debt mediating agency.   
 
Among the 47 cases resolved, 28 were fully implemented and 19 were pending implementation. 
The recovery profile of the resolved cases showed that 83% of the recovery proceeds were in 
the form of cash, redeemable instruments and rescheduled debts.   
 
As of August 15, 2002, only debt restructuring of the Lion Group, amounting to RM8.6 billion, 
was still waiting to be approved by its creditors. The creditors were expected to vote on the 
proposed restructuring scheme as approved by both the Creditors Steering Committee of Lion 
Group and the Securities Commission by August/early September 2002.   
 
Upon the closure of CDRC, the Lion Group and cases which required implementation would be 
monitored by the respective account's Creditors Steering Committee and Danaharta. Regardless 
of the closure of CDRC, bankers and borrowers are required to work together, on a voluntary 
basis, to address any large NPLs in the future, if any.   54
Table 7-1: Progress of Restructuring at Corporate Debt Restructuring Committee (CDRC)   
  Application   Total         Rejection  Transferred  to  Completed    Resolved  with          Cases  
  R e c e i v e d     D e b t     Danaharta         D a n a h a r t a        O u t s t a n d i n g     
(NOB)    (RM  mil) (NOB)    (RM  mil)  (NOB)    (RM  mil)  (NOB)    (RM  mil) (NOB)    (RM  mil) (NOB)     (RM  mil) 
3Q/1998  20      5350.2        20        5350.2 
4Q/1998  36      11028.15    2        344.5   2       954.3   34      10683.65 
1Q/1999  52      26018.52 4      849.85     4        1153.3  2       954.3   44      24015.37 
2Q/1999  62      33039.64 8      2053.05     10        10249.4  2       954.3  42      19782.37 
3Q/1999  63      35024.65 14      3259.35     11       11234.89  2       954.3  36      19576.13 
4Q/1999  66      35652.77 15      3504.35   8        2764.7   13       11778.29  2       954.3  28      16651.13 
1Q/2000  68      36519.2  13      2760.45   10        3298.44   17       13106.84  2       954.3  26      16399.17 
2Q/2000  71      39643.01 16      3822.63   9        1813.54   23       17392.49  2       954.3  21      15660.05 
3Q/2000  75      45938.82 18      4072.57   9        1813.54   28       23085.17  2       954.3  18      16013.24 
4Q/2000  75      47209.75 21      7825.89   9        1813.54   31       25476.92  2       954.3  12      11139.1  
1Q/2001  75      47209.75 21      7825.89   9        1813.54   33       25816.82  2       954.3  10      10799.2  
2Q/2001  75      47378.75 21      7825.89   9        1813.54   33       27576.92  2       954.3  8       9208.1  
Source: Bank Negara Malaysia, Annual Report 2001.     55
Table 7-2: CDRC resolved Cases, August 21, 2002   
Total Resolved Cases RM 43.97 billion     
TRANSFERRED TO DANAHARTA  WITHDRAWN CASES 
Approved by lenders but pending implementation 
RM 9.71 billion   
Fully Implemented 
RM 34.26 billion   
 
RM 2.47 billion   
RM8.67 billion   
1 Mycom Group of Companies    20 Renong Bhd    1 NCK Corporation Bhd    1 HICOM Holding Bhd   
2 Negeri Sembilan Cement Industries Sdn Bhd    21 TIME Engineering Bhd    2 Abrar Group International Sdn Bhd    2 KESAS Sdn Bhd   
3 MetroVision Television Network    22 Johor Corporation    3 Jupiter Securities Bhd    3 Metroplex Berhad   
4 Dataprep Holdings Bhd    23 Titan Group    4 Timber Master Industries Bhd    4 First Time Holdings Ltd   
5 Hai Ming Holdings Berhad    24 Projek Usahasama Transit Ringan Automatik Sdn Bhd    5 PERSTIMA Bhd      5 Diversified Resources Bhd   
6 Gadek (M) Berhad    25 United Engineers (M) Bhd    6 Cableview Services Sdn Bhd    6 Pengkalen Holdings Bhd   
7 Idris Hydraulic (M) Bhd    26 Sistem Transit Aliran Ringan Sdn Bhd ("STAR")    7 Bridgecon Holdings Bhd    7 Kelanamas Industries Bhd  
8 Cygal Berhad    27 Linkedua Bhd    8 Abrar Corporation Berhad    8 United Mal-Jal Air-Conditioning 
Sdn B   
9 Plantation & Development (M) Bhd    28 Expressway Lingkaran Tengah Sdn Bhd ("ELITE")    9 Magnitude Network Sdn Bhd    9 Minho (M) Bhd  
10 Trans Capital Holding Bhd    29 Faber Group Bhd    10 Red Box (M) Bhd    10 Econstates Bhd   
11 Nam Fatt Corporation Bhd    30 Naluri Bhd    11 Suasa Unik (M) Sdn Bhd    11 Silver Concept Sdn Bhd   
12 Sistem Televisyen Malaysia Berhad ("TV3")    31 PROLINK Development Sdn Bhd     
13 Chase Perdana Berhad    32 Tongkah Holdings Bhd    REJECTED CASES (Borrowers)   
12 Sutera Harbour Golf & Country 
Club  
13 Beloga Sdn Bhd   
14 Johan Holdings Berhad    33 Asian Pac Holdings Berhad    RM 3.95 billion   
15 George Kent (M) Berhad    34 Advance Synergy Bhd   
35 Tanco Holding Berhad   
1 Gunawan Iron & Steel Sdn Bhd   
2 Parit Perak Holdings Bhd   
14 Nauticalink   
16 Kretam Holdings Berhad  36 Inter Heritage Sdn Bhd    3 Anson Perdana Bhd     
17 Sriwani Holdings Berhad    37 Lien Hoe Corporation Bhd   
38 United Merchant Group Bhd   
4 Instangreen Corporation Bhd   
5 Seremban-Port Dickson Highway     
18 Perbadanan Kemajuan Negeri Pahang ("PKNP")    39 Vibrant Omega Sdn Bhd   
40 Park May Bhd   
6 Sarawak Clinker Sdn Bhd   
7 Taiping Securities Sdn Bhd     
19 Land & General  41 Pembangunan Bandar Mutiara S/B   
42 Setegap Berhad   
8 PTB Westwharft Sdn Bhd   
9 Redimarketing Sdn Bhd     
 
43 Man Yau Holdings Berhad    10 PSC Industries Berhad     
 
44 Orlando Holdings Bhd   
45 Chongai Corporation Bhd   
11 Business Focus Sdn Bhd   
12 Actacorp Holdings Berhad     
 
46 Tenco Bhd   
47 UH Dove Holdings Bhd   
13 HVD Holdings Sdn Bhd   
14 Intrakota Komposit Sdn Bhd     
Source: CDRC     56
8. Summary and Conclusion   
The Malaysian banking sector has suffered from the Asian financial crisis since 1997. The 
direct reasons for the problems included a downturn of the economy and collapse of the 
property and stock markets. However, more fundamental reasons existed in the banking sector 
itself: lack of competition, lack of independent supervision, and lack of prudential regulations. 
Several measures such as setting up Danaharta, Danamodal and CDRC have been taken to 
resolve NPLs and to restructure the banking sector. Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM) also forced 
mergers for consolidation of the banking sector.   
 
Regarding mergers, the merger plan BNM proposed in 1999 was criticized as being politically 
motivated. The plan was modified and completed in 2001. The domestic banking sector was 
finally consolidated into 10 groups. It is essential to understand that the consolidation of the 
banking system cannot be attained by mergers alone. Furthermore, it is not clear if there are a 
sufficient number of healthy banks with shareholders who are willing to invest in weaker 
institutions, given that asset quality is questionable. The speed of the liberalization process to 
allow entry of foreign investors, as well as foreign banks, has been slow. The banking sector 
restructuring, in consolidation and merger progress, is yet to be finalized.   
 
BNM has focused on reducing NPLs in each financial sector to a manageable level. In 
September 1998, BNM relaxed the default period for classifying a loan as non-performing from 
three months to six months. However, this classification was against the strengthening of the 
prudential regulations and was inconsistent with the international practice of three months. The 
legal framework must be strengthened in line with the best international practices.   
 
BNM has taken the right steps by establishing the asset management company of Danaharta, as 
well as the special purpose vehicle Danamodal, to deal with NPLs and recapitalization. On the 
surface, these measure have, to some extent, succeeded in bringing down NPL ratios. However, 
there was skepticism that Danaharta would become a “warehouse” for NPLs. In fact, properties 
sold in open tender sales generated consideration value of RM840.2 million as of July 2001, 
with indicative (assessed) value of RM845.4 million. Other properties, unsold or withdrawn 
from sales, remained within Danaharta’s portfolio as a great concern.   
 
NPLs in the banking system as a whole remained roughly constant, or even increased, 
during 2000. Specifically, NPLs on actual basis rose during the course of 2000. Regarding   57
the sectoral breakdown of NPLs, most of the increase in NPLs came from manufacturing, 
broad property and consumption sectors. The level of NPLs in the manufacturing sector 
grew by 5.6% and the percentage share in total NPLs rose by 1.4% to 16.6% at the end of 
2000. The total amount of NPLs in the property sector increased by RM1.717 billion and 
accounted for 39.2% of total NPLs in the banking sector as of December 2000.   
Despite the measures undertaken for rehabilitation of NPLs, the gross NPLs on actual basis, in 
the banking sector continued to increase during the course of 2001, reflecting the negative 
impact of the world economy on the Malaysian economy. The rate of increase in NPL ratio was 
about 2% among commercial banks. The NPL ratio in merchant banks, however, was 
incredibly high: 21.7% on actual basis, 26.2% on 3-month basis, and 21.6% on 6-month basis. 
The resolution of NPLs in commercial banks and merchant banks had been very slow.   
The most severely affected sectors were manufacturing, broad property and financial services. 
There was an increase in total NPLs of these three sectors from 2000 to 2001, RM12 billion, 
accounted for 86% of the total increase in NPLs in the banking system of RM14 billion. 
Percentage share in total NPLs in manufacturing, broad property and financial services rose by 
about 2% to 18.6%, 41.1%, and 7.9%, respectively. The build up of NPLs was mainly due to 
the persistent economic slowdown and partly due to the negative impact of September 11 on 
the world economy.   
The NPLs in these sectors were mainly concentrated in SMEs. In line with the downward 
economy, SMEs as a whole cannot be anticipated to recover further, but NPLs in these 
manufacturing and property sectors are likely to worsen further. Resolution of NPLs in these 
sectors, specifically rehabilitation of SMEs, would be critical in bringing down the total level of 
NPLs.    58
Appendix: Measures and New Guidelines, 1997-1999   
Year 1997   
<Risk-Weighted Capital Requirement: Measurement of Credit Exposure > 
Effective on June 1, 1997, all banking institutions were required to value their credit exposure 
for interest rate and foreign exchange-related contracts by using the “current exposure method” 
instead of the “original exposure method”.     
The “current exposure method” provided a more updated and continuously revised exposure of 
a contract as it progressed to maturity. Marking-to-market measured the current credit exposure 
of a contract, while the “add-on” factor estimated the potential exposure of the contract that 
might be further incurred over time.   
However, BNM’s revised standards differed slightly from the BIS standards in terms of the 
quantification of risk. As Malaysian banking institutions operate mainly in the local interest 
rate and foreign exchange market, the set of “add-on” factors used in estimating the potential 
future exposure was revised based on risks arising from the local interest rate and foreign 
exchange rate environment.   
<Disclosure Requirements for the Financial Statements of Banking Institutions>   
Effective on October 17, 1997, BNM had further increased the level of transparency in the 
annual financial statements of banking institutions. The additional disclosure requirements are: 
(1) Director’s Report on Business Strategy and Outlook, (2) Sectoral Concentration of Loans, 
(3) Non-Performing Loans, (4) Capital Adequacy (details of the risk-weighted assets according 
to the various categories of risk-weights should be disclosed), (5) Bank Rating.   
 
 
Year 1998   
<Minimum Capital Funds>   
The minimum capital funds of the finance companies increased from the existing RM5 
million to RM300 million by mid-1999. The minimum requirement was further raised to 
RM600 million by end-2000. In addition, the risk-weighted capital ratio of the finance 
companies increased from 8%, as prescribed under the Basle Capital Accord, to 9% by 
end-1998 and to 10% by end-1999. Prudential regulations were also tightened, and   59
supervisory efforts were intensified to aim at the early identification of problem loans and 
solvency issues.   
 
<Funds for SMIs>   
The small- and medium-sized industries (SMIs) got into difficult conditions as a result of the 
adverse effects of the crisis. The strains on their cash flow had affected their debt servicing 
capability leading to deteriorating financial health. Access to financing also became 
increasingly limited. To ensure that viable SMIs continued to have access to credit, the Fund 
for Small and Medium Industries was set up with an initial allocation of RM1 billion in January 
1998 to provide financing to the SMIs at a maximum lending rate of 10% per annum. The 
allocation under the Fund was increased by RM500 million to RM1.5 billion in May 1998. The 
list of participating institutions was also expanded to include all commercial banks, 10 
identified finance companies, all merchant banks and four development finance institutions. 
The maximum lending rate under the Fund was reduced to 8.5% per annum in December 1998.   
<Disclosure Requirements for the Banking Institutions>   
The disclosure requirements in the banking institutions’ half-year financial statements were 
tightened in 1998. Individual banking institutions were required to publish the semi-annual 
income and expenditure statement in greater detail. They were also required to provide 
information on capital adequacy, non-performing loans, breakdown of their commitments and 
contingencies, movements in specific provision, general provision and interest-in-suspense as 
well as credit exposure according to economic sectors. 
In addition, the banking institutions were required to disclose their off-balance sheet items and 
their respective on-balance sheet credit risk equivalents in their annual financial statements.   
 
This disclosure requirement was intended to promote market discipline by encouraging prudent 
behavior. The published information would also help monitor the performance of the banking 
institutions.  
In the attempt to enhance the degree of transparency, banking institutions were required to 
publish key financial indicators on a quarterly basis. Nevertheless, as the crisis became worse, 
vulnerabilities arising from the crisis became more relevant. There was rising concern that 
quarterly publication posed a heavy administrative burden on the banking institutions. In this   60
regard, the requirement on the quarterly publication of financial indicators was temporary. 
Banking institutions were, however, still required to make their financial indicators public on a 
semi-annual basis.     
<Minimum Requirement for General Provisions for Bad and Doubtful Debts>   
BNM raised the minimum level of general provisions for bad and doubtful debts that should be 
maintained by banking institutions to 1.5% of total loans (net of specific provision and 
interest-in-suspense), effective from January 1, 1998. Since 1990, the minimum level of general 
provisions for bad and doubtful debts has been set at 1% of total loans (net of specific provision 
and  interest-in-suspense).    
However, the need for banking institutions to increase their resilience and build up their 
reserves as an additional buffer against possible future loan losses would become more crucial 
in the years ahead. In anticipation of such a need, BNM raised the minimum level of general 
provision required to put together with the package of economic reforms in the 1998 budget.   
<Guidelines on Provisions for Substandard Debts>       
With effect from financial year beginning January 1, 1998, banking institutions were required 
to provide 20% specific provisions against the uncollateralized portion of substandard loans. 
Banking institutions were also required to set aside provisions for off-balance sheet items 
where the banking institution faced credit risk from the failure of counter parties to fulfill their 
contractual obligations.   
These guidelines were mainly to increase the resilience of the banking institutions. However, 
banking institutions with high loan loss reserves as determined by BNM would not 
automatically be required to make provisions for their sub-standard loans.   
<Guidelines on Single Customer Limit>   
With effect from March 25, 1998, the limit on single customer exposure was reduced from 30% 
to 25% of the total capital. Banking institutions were also required to comply with the single 
customer limit on a consolidated group basis. Lowering of the limit was to reduce the 
concentration of risk to a single customer.     
<Risk-Weighted Capital Ratio (RWCR) Compliance Requirement>   
With effect from financial quarter ended on March 31, 1998, banking institutions were required   61
to comply with the minimum risk-weighted capital ratio on a consolidated basis every quarter 
rather than annually.   
As the economy contracted and as activities in the capital market became extremely thin during 
the first three quarters of the year 1998, the ability of shareholders to raise additional capital 
was constrained. In this regard, compliance with the increased minimum capital funds of 
RM600 million by the finance companies and risk-weighted capital ratio of 10% was deferred 
until such time when the economy has recovered and the capital market has stabilized.   
This new requirement will enable BNM to monitor the capital adequacy position of banking 
institutions on a consolidated basis in a timely manner.     
<Reduction of Liquid Asset Ratio> 
With effect from September 3, 1998, the liquid asset ratio requirement for commercial banks 
was reduced from 17% to 15% of their total eligible liabilities. The reduction has also enabled 
gradual phasing in the new liquidity framework introduced by BNM.   
<New Liquidity Framework>   
In July 1998, BNM introduced a new liquidity framework to replace the present liquid asset 
ratio requirement for the banking institutions. To ensure a smooth transition, the system of 
banking institutions was revised to a new framework on January 1, 2000. All banking 
institutions were required to comply with the new framework by January 1, 2000.     
Under the new framework, the liquidity needs of a banking institution is assessed based on its 
ability to match its short-term liquidity requirement with maturing assets. Banking institutions 
are required to make projections on the maturity profile of their assets, liabilities and 
off-balance sheet commitments in a series of maturity ladders, which are expected to assess 
their potential future liquidity surplus and shortfall. To ensure that there is sufficient liquidity to 
meet their liability obligations in the short term, banking institutions are required to maintain, 
as a minimum requirement, adequate liquidity surplus. The new framework ensures the banking 
institutions are aware of their funding structure and their ability to manage their assets and 
liabilities portfolio.     
Year 1999 <Abolishment of TTRS>     62
The Two-Tier Regulatory System (TTRS) for banking institutions was abolished on April 10, 
1999. As the result, incentives that were previously accorded to Tier-1 banking institutions 
were made available to all institutions, subject to the approval of BNM.     
The TTRS was aimed at improving capital quality as well as capital quantity in each banking 
institution through monitoring various measures. However, the TTRS emphasized absolute 
capital size as one of the pre-requisites for the attainment of Tier-1 status, and therefore led 
banking institutions to embark on over-capital expansion funded by borrowings. Consequently, 
significant pressures were exerted on the management of these banking institutions to 
aggressively increase their loan portfolio in order to generate the requisite returns to meet debt 
servicing obligations. This, in turn, contributed to poor asset quality, particularly during the 
economic downturn.   
<Approval for Increases in Capital Funds>   
With effect from April 14, 1999, BNM required future capitalization of banking institutions by 
controlling shareholders to come from non-obligatory sources of financing such as equity, 
internally generated funds and extremely long-term debt (preferably by way of bond issue) of at 
least 10 years maturity. Banking institutions which seek BNM’s approval to issue new capital 
will have to provide BNM a statement on the capital injection according to the degree of 
leverage.  
<Prohibition on Lending to Controlling and/or Influential Shareholders>   
Effective from August 4, 1999, BNM’s guidelines on “Prohibition of loans to its directors, staff 
and their interested corporations” (BNM/GP6) was expanded. It attempted to prohibit the 
granting of credit facilities to shareholders with controlling and/or influential interests in the 
banking institution. It was also intended to prevent granting of credit facilities to any related 
companies of the shareholder, any firm in which the shareholder has interest as a partner, 
manager, agent or guarantor and any person for whom the shareholder is a guarantor.   
<Masterplan>  
BNM has embarked on a master plan for the Malaysian financial system that focuses on 
building the foundation and charting the strategic direction of the banking sector for the next 10 
years. The master plan will provide a long-term vision for the development of a resilient, 
efficient, and competitive banking sector. The objective of the master plan is to ensure that the   63
banking sector operates effectively in the changing domestic and external environments and 
also meets the needs of emerging technological advances.     64
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